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PERPLEXING PRECEDENT: UNITED STATES V. STEVENS
CONFOUNDS A CENTURY OF SUPREME COURT
CONVENTIONALISM AND REDEFINES THE
LIMITS OF "ENTERTAINMENT"
I. INTRODUCTION
The details are too gruesome to convey.' Crush videos, which
in widely graphic and disturbing detail, display women crushing an-
imals to death with stilettos or bare feet, have been in existence
since the 1950s to cater to men with a specific sexual fetish. 2 In the
past twenty years, the proliferation of crush videos and other forms
of animal abuse has exploded due to the advent of the Internet and
the simplicity with which one can search for and download videos
online.3 Compared to videos produced in the early part of the cen-
tury, "[t]he Internet has made distribution of such disturbing mate-
rial much easier, providing a larger and more competitive market
which spurs more production and spurs producers to make mate-
rial more extreme."4 The videos cater to a specific sexual fetish and
1. SeeJoseph J. Anclien, Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal De-
pictions, 40 U. MEm. L. Ri.v. 1, 1-3 (2009) (describing acts of cruelty depicted in
crush videos).
2. See Emma Ricaurte, Comment, Son of Sam and Dog of Sam: Regulating Depic-
tions of Animal Cruelty Through the Use of Criminal Anti-Profit Statutes, 16 Am MAL- L.
171, 173-74 (2009) (discussing crush videos and their recent overwhelming
proliferation). It is estimated that a minimum of 1,000 American men exhibit
preferences for this specific sexual fetish. See id. (noting views of philosophy pro-
fessor Richard C. Richards). Mr. Richards is a philosophy professor at California
State Polytechnic University and focuses his studies on unusual tendencies. See id.
(validating claims regarding crush video popularity). The videos became a true
Internet craze in the late 1990s, thus prompting Congress to act. See Krista
Gesaman, Kitty Stomping is Sick, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 2, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.
newsweek.com/2009/10/02/kitty-stomping-is-sick.print.html (debating implica-
tions of United States v. Stevens).
3. See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 173-74 (emphasizing influence of Internet on
contemporary animal cruelty).
4. Michael Reynolds, Note, Depictions of the Pig Roast: Restricting Violent Speech
Without Burning the House, 82 S. CAL. L. RiEv. 341, 343 (2009) (explaining Internet's
influence on crush video production and distribution and imploring Court to
carve out additional categories of unprotected speech). "The birth of the internet
opened the door for new types of animal abuse to emerge .... These videos are
able to infiltrate mainstream audiences because of increased file sharing networks
and the growing popularity of websites that display violent videos for their shock
value." American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Animal Cruelty,
LEARNING TO Giv, http://learningtogive.org/papers/paper359.htinl (last visited
Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter American Society].
(281)
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sell for between $30 and $100.5 Experts estimate that there are
over three-thousand titles available that accommodate individual
consumer desires and fetishes, and websites often provide consum-
ers with the option to custom produce a video to gratify specific
proclivities. 6 Annual sales in the industry are estimated to reach
nearly $1 million.7
The crush video fabricators do not discriminate regarding the
animals they select to torture and kill.8 The videos primarily depict
mice, hamsters, and other small animals.9 Recently, even cats,
dogs, and monkeys have become victims.'" The videos usually fea-
ture a woman speaking in a dominatrix style voice with the painful
sounds of abused animals audible over her narration.I
Eventually becoming the topic of immense litigation, which ul-
timately reached the Supreme Court in United States v. Stevens, in
October 1999 Congress recognized the absence of legislation com-
bating crush videos and other depictions of animal cruelty.' 2 Al-
though all fifty states and the District of Columbia criminalize
animal cruelty, crush videos and other depictions present unique
challenges to guaranteeing prosecution.' 3 To ensure impossible
5. See Elizabeth L. Kinsella, Note, A Crushing Blow: United States v. Stevens and
the Freedom to Profit from Animal Cruelty, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. Ri.v. 347, 360 (2009) (men-
tioning range of crush video prices and estimating market size).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 106-397, at 2-3 (1999) (detailing conduct depicted in
crush videos and listing motivations behind their production); see also Kinsella,
supra note 5, at 360 (outlining crush video proliferation).
7. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States in
Support of Petitioner at 9, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (No. 08-
769) [hereinafter Brief of Humane Society] (describing vast growth of crush video
industry). "The Humane Society is the nation's largest non-profit animal protec-
tion organization with more than 10 million members and constituents." Id.
8. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 360 (listing species of animals tortured in
crush videos).
9. See Id. (reviewing popular cruelty targets).
10. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 2 (noting recent video confiscations contain-
ing large animals as subjects).
11. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 361 (describing content of crush videos and
role of women in their production).
12. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 3-4 (explaining shortcomings of prior animal
cruelty legislation). For a detailed timeline of events leading up to the passage of
18 U.S.C. § 48 and post Stevens, see The HSUS Applauds Signing ofAnimal Crush Video
Prohibition Act, HUMANE Socnry or THE. UNITED STATES (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.
humanesociety.org/news/pressreleases/2010/12/crush bill_signed- 20910.
html [hereinafter The HSUS Applauds] (praising government response to contro-
versial Supreme Court holding in Stevens).
13. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 361 (reviewing standing animal cruelty laws).
All fifty states now outlaw dogfighting and cockfighting, and forty-three states
make certain acts of animal cruelty a felony offense. See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at
177 (summarizing state anti-cruelty statutes).
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prosecution under animal cruelty statutes, the human actor con-
ceals his or her identity by restricting filming to the waist down.14
Similarly, even if prosecutors identify the person responsible, it is
difficult to establish whether filming occurred within the jurisdic-
tion and within the statute of limitations.15 Finally, animal cruelty
statutes have been ineffective at combating the market for cruelty
videos because although the conduct is illegal, the production, sale,
and distribution of the videos remain permissible.16 Thus, leverag-
ing its power under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, on December 9, 1999, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 48
outlawing certain depictions of animal cruelty.' 7
The statute's goal was to appropriately address the prosecution
difficulties, stating, "whoever knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a
depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depic-
tion in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both."'8 An exceptions clause applied to "any depiction that has
serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, his-
torical, or artistic value."' 9 Furthermore, similar to the distinction
drawn between depicting actual murder and staging murder for en-
tertainment purposes, the animals portrayed in crush videos had to
be live animals.20 Accordingly, film producers that used computer
generated or illustrated animals were not subject to prosecution
under § 48.21 Intending that the statute only target genuine, unjus-
tified cruelty to animals, videos showing acts of ordinary hunting or
14. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 361-62 (detailing form of female participation
in crush videos). In other words, films only show women from the waist down. Id.
15. See id. at 361-62 (discussing prosecution difficulties); see also Ricaurte,
supra note 2, at 182-83 (listing specific challenges facing government in identifying
and prosecuting animal cruelty perpetrators).
16. See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 182-83 (discussing limitations of current
animal cruelty statutes).
17. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 359 (introducing 18 U.S.C. § 48). Congress
justified its actions under the Commerce Clause because crush videos often travel
in interstate commerce. See id. at 360 (explaining Congress's Commerce Clause
justifications). For the full text of the statute, see infra note 26. The bill passed the
House of Representatives 37242 and received unanimous consent in the Senate.
See Louis Fisher, Crush Videos: a Constructive Dialogue, NLJ (Feb. 21, 2011), http://
www.loufisher.org/docs/ci/crushsc.pdf (comparing original 1999 bill to recent
amendments).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (1999).
19. Id.
20. See H.R. REP'. No. 106-397, at 5 (justifying statutory content and disclaim-
ing any restriction on expressive speech).
21. See id. (discussing exceptions clause).
2012] 283
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fishing were excluded from prosecution.22 President Clinton rec-
ognized the risk of the statute being perceived as over-inclusive and
thus issued a statement shortly after the statute was passed clarifying
that:
[He] will broadly construe the Act's exception and will in-
terpret it to require a determination of the value of the
depiction as party of a work or communication, taken as a
whole. So construed, the Act would prohibit the types of
depictions, described in the statute's legislative history, of
wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient
interest in sex.23
Therefore, the Department of Justice was instructed to employ
proper judgment in determining which offenses to prosecute,
favoring those offenses with videos that primarily appealed to sala-
cious desires.24
The definitions provided in the statute narrowed the section's
applications even further.25 Cruelty was understood to represent
conduct where an animal is "intentionally maimed, mutilated, tor-
tured, wounded, or killed," and the conduct had to be illegal under
federal law or the law of the state "in which the creation, sale, or
possession takes place."26 Thus, it was irrelevant whether the con-
22. See id. (excluding content with degree of value from statute's reach).
Other exceptions included slaughtering animals for food, veterinary practices, pest
control, using animals in research laboratories, and using animals for entertain-
ment purposes. See id. at 4 (listing exclusions); see also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at
179 (noting state statute exceptions to animal cruelty).
23. Statement by President William J. Clinton upon signing H.R. 1887, Pub.
L. No. 106-152, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 324 [hereinafter Statement by President].
24. See id. (instructing Department of Justice to construe statute narrowly).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 48 (narrowing statute's reach).
26. § 48. The full text of the statute reads:
(a) Creation, sale, or possession.-Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or
possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that
depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) Exception.-Subsection (a) does not apply to any depiction that has
serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical,
or artistic value.
(c) Definitions.-In this section-
(1) term "depiction of animal cruelty" means any visual or auditory
depiction, including any photograph, motion-picture film, video re-
cording, electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in which a
living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded,
or killed, if such conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of the
State in which the creation, sale, or possession takes place, regardless
of whether the maiming, mutilation, torture, wounding, or killing
took place in the State; and
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss1/8
PERPLEXING PRECEDENT
duct was legally undertaken in a particular state. If the conduct was
illegal in the state in which the video surfaced, the creator faced
prosecution under § 48.27
There were five primary motives behind Congress's endeavor
to pass § 48: protecting animals, preventing future harm to
humans, protecting humans from infliction of emotional harm,
protecting property interests, and preventing morally wrong behav-
ior.2 8 The acts depicted in crush videos and other displays of
animal cruelty inflict an unimaginable, excruciating amount of
pain on the victims portrayed.29 Society has progressively altered its
view of animals and has come to recognize certain basic interests
that should be afforded to humans and animals alike. 0 Regardless,
society maintains that human rights should trump animal rights,
(2) the term "State" means each of the several States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of
the United States.
§ 48.
27. See id. (outlining broad sweep of statute); see also Kinsella, supra note 5, at
360 (describing statute's territorial reach).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 106-397, at 3-5 (outlining Congressional goals behind
§ 48); see also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 180 (listing governmental and societal inter-
ests in prohibiting animal cruelty). Representative Elton Gallegly initiated the bill
in response to complaints from Michael Bradbury, the District Attorney of Ventura
County, California. See Elton Gallegly, Columnist Wrong on Motive Effect of Animal
Cruelty Law, THE HILL (Sept. 7, 2009, 4:46 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/let-
ters/57529-columnist-wrong-on-motive-effect-of-animal-cruelty-law (rejecting no-
tion that § 48 resulted from successful lobbying). "This legislative idea was not
brought to me by an animal rights organization or other lobbyist . . . it was in
response to the loopholes in existing state law, not because of lobbyists, that I
introduced the legislation." Id.
29. See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 180-81 (conveying harm inflicted upon
animal victims).
30. See Julie China, Animal Welfare vs. Free Speech, 57 FED. LAw. 4, 4 (2010)
(encouraging societal progress in recognition of animal rights); see also Ricaurte,
supra note 2, at 180-81 (mentioning society's shift from treating animals as prop-
erty to recognizing them as genuine victims). Concern for animal rights can be
traced back to ancient times where Hindu and Buddhist scriptures advocate ethi-
cal animal treatment. See Doris Lin, Historical Timeline of the Animal Rights Move-
ment, ABOUT.COM, http://animalrights.about.com/od/animalrightslOl/a/time
linemodern.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). For a detailed timeline of modern
animal rights progression from 1975 to present, see id. Inclinations to protect ani-
mals from abuse can also be seen in writings from John Locke, Alexander Pope,
and Immanuel Kant. See The History of Human-Animal Interaction - In England, Phi-
losophers Argue Against Cruelty to Animals, NET INDUSTRIES, http://www.libraryindex.
com/pages/2153/History-Human-Animal-Interaction-in-england-philosophers-
argueagainst-cruelty-animals.html (noting animal protection proclivities are not
and have never been localized to United States).
2012] 285
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and thus, the human interests implicated from animal cruelty sur-
pass all other motives. 3'
While not immediately obvious, there are various risks to
humans associated with marketing depictions of animal cruelty. 2
First, there is a strong causal link between violence towards animals
and later violence inflicted upon humans.33 One commentator
noted, "[t]here is growing evidence to suggest that childhood
animal cruelty has the potential of 'upgrading' to violence towards
humans at a later stage."34 Through watching violent content, view-
ers subconsciously learn violent behavior and become desensitized
to the abhorrent material.3 5 The less shocking and disturbing the
31. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 347-50 (discussing research regarding effects
of animal cruelty on humans and society); see also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 180-81
(listing government interests in passing § 48).
32. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 3-4 (describing human ills associated with
animal cruelty); see also Reynolds, supra note 4, at 351-52 (summarizing effects of
violence on victims and observers); Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 180-81 (emphasizing
human risks associated with animal cruelty); Buddy Amato, Animal Cruelty is a Pre-
cursor to Other Dangers, AMATO's Goju-RYE, http://www.amatosgojuryu.com/col-
umns/49.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (recognizing limitations of advocating
against animal abuse to those who are not animal or pet supporters); Dangers of
Cruelty to Animals, NADER.ORc Uune 26, 1989), http://www.nader.org/index.php?/
archives/1 628-dangers-of-cruelty-to-animals.html (discussing research showing
human dangers stemming from animal cruelty); Facts About Animal Abuse &Domes-
tic Violence, AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanhumane.org/in-
teraction/support-the-bond/fact-sheets/animal-abuse-domestic-violence.html (last
visited Oct. 6, 2011) (listing animal abuse statistics in association with resulting
human ills such as domestic violence and sexual abuse); Problem Child, The Link
Between Animal Abuse and Serial Killers, YAHOO (Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.associat-
edcontent.com/article/425882/the link betweenanimal-abuse and serial.
html?cat=17 (discussing serial killers, school shooters, domestic violence, and
other violent acts against people with noted links to animal cruelty); Frank R. As-
cione, AnimalAbuse and Youth Violence,JUVENILE JUSTICE (Sept. 2001), http://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/188677.pdf (arguing animal abuse receives insufficient
attention as causal link to dangerous behavior).
33. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 3-4 (explaining gateway between animal
abuse and later human violence). Humans who commit violent acts often do so as
a result of a long pattern of abuse, beginning with animal torture. See id. (summa-
rizing human timeline of abuse). "Cruelty towards animals is the most basic exam-
ple 6f the need for power and dominance." Dresden Quinn Jones, Psychology of
People Hurting Animals: What Early Violent Behavior Towards Animals May Indicate,
SUITE101 (June 22, 2009), http://www.suitel0l.com/content/psychology-of-peo-
pie-hurting-animals-al25937.
34. Antonietta Salerno, Childhood Animal Cruelty and Link to Violence Toward
Humans, SUITE101 (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.suitel01.com/content/childhood-
animal-cruelty-linked-to-violence-toward-humans-a313159.
35. See Reynolds, supra note 4 at, 351-52 (formalizing effects of desensitiza-
tion, called "mean world syndrome"). When surveyed, "more than half of the
thirty-five convicted serial killers questioned by the FBI admitted torturing animals
as children." Kinsella, supra note 5, at 379. See alsoJeremy Wright & Christopher
Hensley, From Animal Cruelty to Serial Murder: Applying the Graduation Hypothesis,
47(1) INTERNATIONALJOURNAL OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINOL.
[Vol. 19: p. 281
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content becomes, the more people are inclined to accept the be-
havior as normal and face an elevated risk of committing the acts
themselves.3 6 A growing amount of research is being done in this
area, and "[r]esearchers as well as FBI law enforcement agencies
nationwide have linked animal cruelty to domestic violence, child
abuse, serial killings and to the recent rash of killings by school age
children . .. ." Criminal violence often originates in childhood
acts of animal cruelty because children fail to appreciate the value
of life.38 Additionally, research has linked the market for depic-
tions of animal cruelty to other illegalities such as gambling, weap-
ons possession, and gang activity, often offenses committed
simultaneously.3 9 Likewise, on the opposite end of the spectrum,
there is a strong interest in protecting humans from infliction of
emotional harm, as exposure to animal cruelty can induce a range
of emotional disorders including depression, fear, and anxiety. 40
Despite animals' status in many homes as equal family members
and beloved pets, they largely remain classified as personal property
OGY 71 (2003), available at http://ijo.sagepub.com/content/47/l/71.full.pdf
(studying graduation hypothesis to equate early animal cruelty to adult murder).
"[W]ithin the framework of the graduation hypothesis, children who are cruel to
animals may then graduate to aggressive behaviors towards humans." Id. See also
What is the Link?, NATIONAL. LINK COALITION, http://www.nationallinkcoalition.
org/index (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (linking exposure to animal cruelty with de-
sensitization effect). In fact, notorious serial killers Ted Bundy, David Berkowitz,
andJeffrey Dahmer all admitted to torturing and killing animals in their youth. See
id. (providing background of strong link between childhood acts of animal cruelty
and later violent crimes). Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the perpetrators of the
gruesome Columbine shootings, bragged about their particular acts of animal cru-
eity to their friends, including mutilating and murdering animals. See Tigerquoll,
Animal Abuse Inculcates Social Deviance, WE CAN Do BE rrER (Apr. 3, 2010), http://
candobetter.net/node/1929 (reviewing research suggesting animal abuse is a
faultless predictor of social deviance).
36. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 379 (discussing Stevens compelling interest
rationale). "Nearly one-half of rapists and one-fourth of pedophiles engaged in
the abuse of animals as children." Janie Ellington, Understanding the Side Effects of
Animal Cruelty, AN APPLE A DAY (Mar. 2010), http://www.anapplemag.com/book/
export/html/ 121.
37. Problem Child, supra note 32.
38. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 4 (justifying statutory content based on cul-
minating harm); see also Brief of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner at 16, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (No. 08-769)
[hereinafter Brief of Florida] (emphasizing roots of criminal violence in child-
hood acts).
39. See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 180 (listing correlation between animal cru1-
eity and other crimes); see also Dog Fighting, THE ANTI-CRUET-ry SocIETY, http://
www.anticruelty.org/site/epage/36628 576.htm?printstyle=true (last visited Oct.
6, 2011) (describing harmful secondary effects of animal abuse). For a discussion
specific to dogfighting, see infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
40. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 351-52 (commenting on human psychologi-
cal effects of viewing animal cruelty).
2872012]
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under the law, thus elucidating Congress's motivation to protect
property interests.4 '
Finally, there is a general inclination to prevent morally wrong
behavior.42 "The [House] committee is of the view that the great
majority of Americans believe that all animals ... should be treated
in ways that do not cause them to experience excessive physical
pain or suffering."4 3 The government justified its actions based on
widespread belief that a reasonable person would find any redeem-
ing value of the depictions to be severely outweighed by the desire
to prevent the various harms associated with animal cruelty.4 4
Acknowledging the statute's most basic motive to eliminate the
market for cruelty videos, the statute was a sweeping success, the
market for crush videos rapidly dissipated, and the films, according
to California State Representative Elton Gallegly, were expelled
from existence.4 5 Due to the Third Circuit and subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions in Stevens, crush videos reemerged in full
force. 4 6 The Court struck down § 48 as overbroad, declining to rec-
ognize depictions of animal cruelty as a category of speech worthy
of receiving a categorical exclusion from First Amendment protec-
tion.4 7 The government's compelling interests were held trivial
when balanced against competing First Amendment rights.48
41. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-397, at 4 (dictating legislature's goal to protect per-
sonal property); see also China, supra note 30, at 4 (rejecting animals' classification
as property under law); Gary L. Francione, Animals as Property, 2 ANIMAL L. 1
(1996), available at http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arusgfrancione1996.htm
(criticizing primary treatment of animals as property); Catherine L. Wolfe, Animals
are "Property" Under the Law, WoLFE PACK Pmuss, http://www.wolfepackpress.org/
pdf/Animals not -Property.pdf (claiming laws treating animals as property are "ar-
cane" and detrimental to societal advancement).
42. See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 180 (listing government interest in morality);
see also Jeremy Pierce, Moral Justifications for Laws, PARABLEMAN (Sept. 27, 2005,
12:29 PM), http://parablemania.ektopos.com/archives/2005/09/moraljustifica.
html ("Our laws are thoroughly based on a moral code. That's the primary justifi-
cation for them.").
43. H.R. RiP. No. 106-397, at 4.
44. See id. (balancing harms of animal cruelty with any conceivable scant value
in depictions).
45. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 5 (praising sweeping success of statute); see
also Elton W. Gallegly, Beyond Cruelty, U.S. FED. NEws, Dec. 16, 2007, available at
2007 WLNR 24908285 (justifying introduction of Federal Dog Protection act into
Congress).
46. SeeAnclien, supra note 1, at 5 (noting reemergence of crush videos follow-
ing Third Circuit decision).
47. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (grounding anal-
ysis on well-established categories of unprotected speech).
48. See id. at 1586 (declining proposition to grant itself "freewheeling" author-
ity to carve out categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection based on
government's "highly manipulable" balancing test).
[Vol. 19: p. 281
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The purpose of this Note is to consider the widespread implica-
tions of United States v. Stevens.49 Specifically, this Note will consider
the likelihood of future findings of a compelling governmental in-
terest, the level of harm required when balancing competing inter-
ests, Congress's ability to supplement ineffective laws, and the
Court's ability to recognize new categories of speech unworthy of
even basic First Amendment protection.50 Part II outlines the facts
of Stevens.5' Part III reviews the background of relevant First
Amendment law, including discussions of content-based versus con-
tent-neutral regulations, the Court's criteria for defining new cate-
gories of unprotected speech, the Court's general requirements
and precedent for fulfilling a strict scrutiny analysis, and the
Court's general approach to facial invalidity claims. 5 2 Part III also
discusses the dogfighting industry and other instances of animal
cruelty present in modern sports and entertainment culture.55 Part
IV deciphers the Court's reasoning behind the decision.5 4 Part IV
also provides an analysis of the Court's reasoning based on prece-
dent and opines that the Court was hasty in forming its opinion
without scrutinizing the far-reaching implications of its decision in
other realms of law.5 5 Finally, Part V examines the implications of
the Court's decision in disparate areas of law outside the First
Amendment context.5 6 This Note concludes that the result of Ste-
vens is that the government's burden to show a compelling interest
will be virtually impossible to fulfill, and the Court constricted its
ability to recognize new categories of unprotected speech in future
cases.57 The government will face a heightened burden to show
49. For a presentation of the basic tenets of this Note, see infra notes 50-58
and accompanying text.
50. See infra Part IV-VI (reviewing facts of case, Court's analysis, and author's
conclusions).
51. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text (giving background of Stevens
case).
52. See infra notes 73-173 and accompanying text (studying relevant back-
ground to Stevens).
53. See infra notes 174-207 and accompanying text (illustrating realities of dog
fighting).
54. See infra notes 209-298 and accompanying text (providing narrative of
case).
55. See infra notes 299-394 and accompanying text (giving critical analysis of
case).
56. See infra notes 395-446 and accompanying text (concluding Note).
57. See id. (exposing now heightened barriers to litigating on behalf of animal
rights).
2012] 289
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requisite harm and will be constrained in its ability to revise laws
that fail to serve their intended purpose.58
II. FACTS
The facts of United States v. Stevens are uncharacteristically sim-
ple for a Supreme Court case.59 Respondent RobertJ. Stevens ran a
business entitled "Dogs of Velvet and Steel" through which he sold
videos of various forms of dogfights.60 There were three videos in-
volved in Stevens's conviction, each depicting dogfights involving
dogs or boars: "Pick-A-Winna," 'Japan Pit Fights," and "Catch
Dogs.""' All three videos contained audio commentary and litera-
ture that Stevens wrote and recorded."2  Stevens advertised the
videos in the Sporting Dog Journal, "an underground publication
featuring articles on illegal dogfighting."53 When Pennsylvania law
enforcement officers discovered Stevens's advertisements, they
commenced an investigation and arranged to purchase three video-
tapes.64 Investigators obtained a search warrant for Stevens's Vir-
58. See id. (noting Stevens's effect on strict scrutiny doctrine and increased dif-
ficulty now faced by legislature because of Court's new standard).
59. See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2008), aff'd, 130
S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (discussing facts of case); see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S.
Ct. 1577, 1583-84 (2010) (reiterating Stevens's conduct leading to his conviction).
60. See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 220-21 (describing Stevens's dogfighting business).
Stevens also ran a website entitled "Pitbulllife.com." See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at
184 (mentioning Internet link to Stevens's videos). Stevens claimed his business
was educational, as it sold educational material about pit bulls, such as documents
to help hunters catch prey. See Greg Stohr, Animal 'Crush Video'Law Voided by U.S.
Supreme Court (Update2), BUSINEsSWEEK (Apr. 20, 2010, 11:43 AM), http://www.busi-
nessweek.com/news/2010-04-20/animal-cruelty-law-struck-down-in-u-s-supreme-
court-ruling.html (on file with author) (discussing background of Stevens).
61. See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 220-21 (summarizing dogfights contained in Ste-
vens's videos). "Pick-A-Winna" was filmed in the 1960s or 1970s in the United
States and contained footage of organized fights between Pit Bulls. See Stevens, 130
S. Ct. at 1583 (commenting on origin of "Pick-A-Winna" video). 'Japan Pit Fights"
was filmed around the same time but depicted legal dogfights in Japan. See id.
(noting slight difference in video content). Stevens said 'Japan Pit Fights" was
used to compare dogs trained for hunting and dogs trained for fighting. SeeStohr,
supra note 60 (reviewing videos forming basis of Stevens's indictment). "Catch
Dogs" was a hybrid hunting video showing pit bulls hunting wild boar, "as well as a
'gruesome' scene of a pit bull attacking a domestic farm pig." Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at
1583-84 (conveying deplorable content in Stevens's third video).
62. See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 220-21 (mentioning Stevens's involvement in the
videos and implying authorities effortlessly linked him to the videos' creation).
Stevens described himself as "a book author and documentary film producer who
specializes in promoting pit bulls." Stohr, supra note 60.
63. See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 220-21 (noting irony of Stevens's advertising and
his resulting arrest). After discovering Stevens's advertising in thejournal, authori-
ties had a direct link and evidence to carry-out Stevens's investigation. See id.
(describing investigation).
64. See id. (summarizing authorities' investigation of Stevens).
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ginia residence on April 23, 2003, which allowed officers to find
several copies of the videos, in addition to ample dogfighting
merchandise.6 5
On March 2, 2004, a grand jury in the Western District of
Pennsylvania indicted Stevens "with three counts of knowingly sell-
ing depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those
depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 48."66 Stevens unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the
indictment, claiming the statute was facially invalid under the First
Amendment.67 After a jury trial, on January 13, 2005, the jury
found Stevens guilty on all three counts, and he was sentenced to
thirty-seven months imprisonment followed by three years of super-
vised release. 8
On appeal, the Third Circuit declared § 48 facially unconstitu-
tional and vacated Stevens's conviction.69 The Third Circuit rested
its decision upon the contention that § 48 regulates speech deserv-
ing of First Amendment protection, while emphasizing the Su-
preme Court's general unwillingness to carve out additional
categories of unprotected speech.7 0 Furthermore, the court con-
ducted a strict scrutiny review and struck down § 48 as a content-
based regulation of protected speech, meaning the government
lacked a narrowly tailored, compelling interest and failed to use the
65. See id. (describing authorities' search of Stevens's residence).
66. See id. (dictating grand jury conviction). It is significant to note that Ste-
vens's case was the first prosecution in the United States based on a violation of
§ 48. See id. (noting novelty of prosecution under § 48 as of Third Circuit's
decision).
67. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1583-84 (2010) (mentioning
unsuccessful motion to dismiss on grounds of facial invalidity). The District Court
held that the depictions covered under § 48 were categorically unprotected by the
First Amendment, similar to obscenity or child pornography. See id. (summarizing
district court holding). It also concluded that the statute was not overbroad due to
the exceptions clause that narrowed the statute to allowable constitutional applica-
tions. See id. (commenting on district court's analysis of statute's exceptions
clause).
68. See id. (reiterating Stevens's sentence); see also Stevens, 533 F.3d at 220-21
(reviewing district court's sentencing decision).
69. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583-84 (discussing Third Circuit overbreadth
analysis). Three judges dissented. See id. (noting Third Circuit split).
70. See id. (emphasizing reliance on Supreme Court precedent). The Third
Circuit was particularly hesitant to carve out additional categories of unprotected
speech due to the Supreme Court's unwillingness to do the same. See Reynolds,
supra note 4, at 347 (arguing alternative analysis). Reynolds argued that the Third
Circuit should have carved out an additional category of unprotected speech, re-
gardless of Supreme Court inaction. See id. (rejecting Third Circuit reasoning).
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least restrictive means to prevent animal cruelty.7 1 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.72
III. BACKGROUND
A. More Than a Mere Hint of Unconstitutionality:
Overbreadth Challenges
Stevens's case was the first violation of § 48 to proceed to trial,
and thus case law specific to depictions of animal cruelty is virtually
nonexistent.7 1 Nevertheless, there is an abundance of precedent
relevant to the First Amendment issues presented to the Supreme
Court, specifically regarding the Court's application of strict scru-
tiny and its inclination to carve out additional areas of unprotected
speech. 74
As one of the most famously contested provisions of the United
States Constitution, the First Amendment reads, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances."75 The most
common argument to invalidate a federal statute is to assert that
the statute is overbroad and thus facially invalid.76 The Court con-
sidered the issue in three notable cases.7 7
In the most recent Supreme Court decision dealing with the
First Amendment, United States v. Williams, the Court examined a
section of Title 18 that criminalizes "the pandering or solicitation of
71. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (reiterating Third Circuit's strict scrutiny
analysis). The Third Circuit also gave a cursory glance to the argument that § 48 is
overbroad, but due to its substantive conclusions relying on stronger theories, the
court declined to rest its conclusion on an overbroad basis. See id. (noting Third
Circuit's unwillingness to consider an overbreadth challenge).
72. See id. (stating Supreme Court grant of certiorari).
73. See Stevens, 533 F.3d at 221 (recognizing primacy of § 48 analysis).
74. See infra notes 109-173 and accompanying text (discussing Court's strict
scrutiny doctrine and illustrating Court's hesitation to carve out new categories of
unprotected speech).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
76. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292-93 (2008) (outlining
Court's overbreadth doctrine). For a discussion of the Court's history applying the
overbreadth doctrine, see Alfred Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1063 (1997) (arguing Court has not consistently applied
overbreadth doctrine, leading to confusing and conflicting results).
77. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 292-93 (holding majority of pornography statute's
applications raised no constitutional problems); Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
706-07 (1997) (concluding social consensus was critical in considering assisted-sui-
cide statute); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741-43 (1987) (holding con-
ceivable impermissible application of a statute does not warrant its invalidation).
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child pornography." 7  Previously, the Court held that statutes
preventing the distribution of all child pornography did not, on
their face, violate the First Amendment, irrespective of whether the
pornographic material in question qualified as obscene.79 Further,
a statute was overbroad and facially invalid if it prohibited a sub-
stantial amount of protected speech.80 In its final analysis of
whether the statute could criminalize soliciting child pornography,
the Court balanced the social costs of upholding the statute against
the threat of discouraging people from engaging in constitutionally
protected speech.8 ' It noted that striking down a law that has per-
fectly constitutional applications can be as harmful as stifling the
free exchange of ideas.8 2 Thus, "a statute's overbreadth [must] be
substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 3
The first step in the overbreadth challenge was to construe the
disputed statute to determine what conduct it covered. 4 Only after
analyzing the statute's reach did the Court then determine if the
statute criminalized a substantial amount of protected "expressive
activity."8 5 It is important to note the Court's clarification of the.
overbreadth doctrine: "The 'mere fact that one can conceive of
some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to
render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge."8 6 In Williams,
the majority of the statute's applications raised no constitutional
problems, which implied that the Court conducts an overview of a
78. See Williams, 553 U.S at 288 (introducing child pornography statute).
79. See id. (commenting on child pornography). For further discussion of the
Court's holding in several landmark child pornography cases, see Ashcroft v. Free
Speech CoaL, Osborne v. Ohio, and N.Y. v. Ferber. See infra notes 153-172 and accompa-
nying text (reviewing details of cases); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535
U.S. 234 (2002) (holding general ban on virtual child pornography overbroad and
undue restriction on freedom of speech).
80. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (stating components of overbreadth test).
81. See id. (reiterating balance between speech and societal costs). The Court
cited the theory of the free exchange of ideas, popularized by theoristJohn Stuart
Mill. See id. (disclaiming inhibition of permissible free speech); see also Reynolds,
supra note 4, at 355 (outlining justifications for free speech).
82. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (emphasizing statutes directed "at conduct so
antisocial that it has been made criminal").
83. Id.
84. See id. at 293 (stating first step in overbreadth analysis). The Court ob-
served that it would be difficult to determine if a statute reached too far without
first observing what areas the statute covers. See id. (justifying initial step in
analysis).
85. See id. at 297 (introducing second step in an overbreadth discussion).
86. Id. at 303 (quoting Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)).
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statute's applications and identifies the permissible and impermissi-
ble applications of the provisions.87
Prior to Williams, the Court considered the overbreadth doc-
trine in Washington v. Glucksberg and United States v. Salerno."8 Gluck-
sberg is a notable case regarding a Washington statute that
criminalized assisting a medical patient in committing suicide. 9
While the Court discussed the overbreadth doctrine in a similar
fashion in its later Williams decision, the Court made several influ-
ential points relevant to an overbreadth analysis.90 The Court reaf-
firmed its position that societal consensus in the form of a pattern
of enacted laws is important to consider when analyzing the validity
of a federal or state statute.9'
In his concurrence, Justice Souter discussed the proper role of
the judiciary.92
It is no justification for judicial intervention merely to
identify a reasonable resolution of contending values that
differs from the terms of the legislation under review. It is
only when the legislation's justifying principle, critically
valued, is so far from being commensurate with the indi-
vidual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied
that the statute must give way.93
Justice Souter also set forth several specific situations in which the
Court should not defend a finding that the legislature acted arbi-
trarily.94 First, "[when] there is a serious factual controversy over
87. See id. at 292-303 (applying overbreadth doctrine to content of statute).
88. See Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (maintaining due process
clause does not grant fundamental right to assisted suicide and government has
legitimate interest in banning practice); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987) (holding pretrial detention not violation of procedural due process when
person held poses future danger).
89. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 706-07 (summarizing Washington's assisted-sui-
cide laws).
90. See id. at 707-09 (noting plaintiffs facial challenge to statute).
91. See id. at 711 ("[T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national]
consensus is ... the pattern of enacted laws.") (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 373 (1989)). In Glucksberg, opposition and condemnation of suicide were
considered "enduring themes" in United States history, and thus, the Court extra-
polated that assisted suicide would face a similar critique. See id. (recognizing ex-
tensive societal inclinations against assisted-suicide).
92. See id. at 768 (emphasizing level of deference properly accorded to
legislature).
93. Id. He proceeded to clarify that only when the standard is in opposition
to the statute can the individual properly claim a constitutional right. See id. (clari-
fying stated position).
94. See id. at 786-87 (discussing proper Supreme Court deference to legislative
judgment).
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the feasibility of recognizing the claimed right without at the same
time making it impossible for the State to engage in an undoubt-
edly legitimate exercise of power."9 5 The second exclusion from
judicial judgment is when there are facts that are not readily ascer-
tainable through judicial review, but are more properly reserved for
discovery though the legislative process of factfinding and experi-
mentation.96 Justice Souter emphasized that the legislative setting
is more apt to acquire facts necessary for a proper determination of
statutory constitutionality.9 7 Accordingly, societal consensus often
emerges in the form of legislative judgment because the legislature
operates in the suitable forum to analyze the issues and make valua-
ble adjustments to statutory provisions based on feedback and
criticism.98
Justice Souter's views were shared in an earlier Supreme Court
case, Salerno, where the Court considered the constitutionality of
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, which allowed the federal govern-
ment, absent certain exceptions, to detain an arrestee if the safety
of individuals or the community was at risk.99 The Court noted that
the statute was passed in response to the "numerous deficiencies" of
the federal bail process. 0 o Thus, the Court implied its acceptance
of the legislature's attempt to rectify definitive problems in federal
programs.' 0 The Salerno case outlined the Court's application of
the overbreadth doctrine, requiring the challenger to establish that
"no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid." 0 2 The fact that a statute may be unconstitutional in some
conceivable situation is insufficient to render the statute wholly
invalid. 0 -3
95. Id. at 786.
96. See id. at 786-87 (mentioning inability of judiciary to discern all relevant
facts and contributing views).
97. See id. at 788 (contending legislature is uniquely situated to make statutory
decisions). "Not only do they have more flexible mechanisms for factfinding than
the Judiciary, but their mechanisms include the power to experiment, moving for-
ward and pulling back as facts emerge within their own jurisdictions." Id.
98. See id. at 711, 786-88 (describing emersion of societal consensus in the
legislative forum).
99. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741-43 (1987) (reviewing Bail
Reform Act of 1984 and its application).
100. See id. at 742 (noting deficiencies in Act).
101. See id. (accepting legislature's judgment that bail process could be re-
formed through Act's passage).
102. See id. at 745 (providing overview of overbreadth doctrine).
103. See id. (limiting application of doctrine). The Court noted that the over-
breadth doctrine, as of 1987, had been limited exclusively to the First Amendment
context. See id. (dictating that burden rests with respondents to prove Act is
facially invalid).
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As Justice Souter would discuss in the later Glucksberg decision,
the Court in Salerno extensively discussed the importance of legisla-
tive intent in construing a controversial statute.1 O14 The Court
stated,
To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes
impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, we
first look to legislative intent. Unless Congress expressly
intended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/reg-
ulatory distinction turns on 'whether an alternative pur-
pose to which [the restriction] may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears ex-
cessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to
it].''os
In Salerno, a potential solution to a problematic societal problem
was proper justification for the legislature to pass the Act to prevent
danger to the community. 0 6 Therefore, the Court's overbreadth
cases reveal its unwillingness to invalidate a statute simply because
the statute has a conceivable unconstitutional application, along
with the importance of discovering legislative intent before hand-
ing down a decision.' 0 7 The Court wavered on its unwillingness in
Stevens. 108
B. Negligible Societal Value: Content-Based
Restrictions on Speech
Aside from an overbreadth challenge, when First Amendment
conflicts concerning content-based regulation of speech come
before the Court, the Court often rests its decision on a strict scru-
tiny analysis.o 9 As opposed to content-neutral regulations,
" [c] ontent-based regulations focus on the communicative impact of
speech. In other words, they restrict communication because of the
104. See id. at 747 (noting legislative intent is instructive in construing chal-
lenged statutes).
105. Id.
106. See id. (granting deference to legislative judgment).
107. See supra, notes 73-107 (surveying Court's jurisprudence on overbreadth
doctrine).
108. See supra notes 223-252 and accompanying text for further discussion of
the Court's reasoning in Stevens.
109. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 355-58 (reviewing Supreme Court precedent
concerning content-based versus content-neutral regulations). The Court rea-
soned that restrictions based on content often implicate censorship; censorship
being an impermissible withholding of First Amendment protection. See id. at 355-
56 (discussingjustifications for more exacting Supreme Court scrutiny when regu-
lation targets speech based on content).
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message expressed." 10 While the Supreme Court's content-based
strict scrutiny case law'is expansive, this Note will focus on three
decisions relevant to Stevens."'
In a landmark case concerning content-based regulations of
speech, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,112 the petitioner was
charged with violating a crime ordinance after allegedly burning a
cross on an African American family's lawn." 3 The Court legiti-
mized its analysis by opining that the law prohibits speech based on
speech content, ultimately concluding that the law did not serve the
City's advanced compelling interests." 4
The Court reaffirmed that certain content-based restrictions
are permissible in limited circumstances where the speech is "of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."" 5 Likewise, non-verbal expressive activity is
proscribable based on the action entailed, not necessarily because
of the content of the "speech."' 16
The Court emphasized the importance of upholding neutral
exclusions of certain speech, including content-based speech,
where there is no danger of "idea or viewpoint" discrimination.' 17
For example, a state may choose to prohibit obscenity catering to-
wards a prurient interest that involves "lascivious" displays of sexual
activity." 8 Addressing the City's argument that the regulation was
an attempt at controlling the "secondary effects" of the speech, the
Court recognized that these kinds of regulations are justified with-
110. Id. at 356.
111. See infra notes 113-135 (examining cases).
112. 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992).
113. See id. (discussing facts of case).
114. See id. at 381, 395-96 (requiring heightened scrutiny for content-based
restriction on speech). The City claimed the law prevented so called "secondary
effects" of speech like provoking violence. See id. at 389 (rejecting City's secondary
effects defense).
115. See id. at 382-83 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)) (implying acceptance of review of value of challenged speech).
116. See id. at 385 (distinguishing between expressive conduct and pure
speech). For example, the Court clarified by providing an example: "[B] urning a
flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable,
whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag is
not." Id.
117. See id. at 388 (distinguishing between viewpoint-based speech and gen-
eral speech subject to neutral regulations).
118. See id. (illustrating Court's First Amendment obscenity exception). Con-
versely, obscenity including a political message is not subject to regulation. See id.
(implying overwhelming importance of political speech).
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out reference to the content of the speech, but only if the secon-
dary effects are associated with obscenity." 9
The Court also dealt with controversial content-based restric-
tions in its sole case contemplating animal cruelty: Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.120 The case dealt with a
city ordinance instituted to prevent people affiliated with the
Santeria religion from practicing ritual animal sacrifices.12' The at-
torney general intended to prohibit unmotivated acts committed
"in the spirit of wanton cruelty" without any benefit or use to the
perpetrator.'2 2 In subjecting the ordinance to strict scrutiny, the
Court concluded that the City's concerns of preventing the suffer-
ing or mistreatment of the sacrificed animals, as well as the poten-
tial for health hazards from improper disposal, were legitimate
government interests.123
Relying on precedent established in landmark equal protec-
tion cases, the Court listed several pieces of evidence courts may
consider when scrutinizing government interests.124 justice Ken-
nedy established several landmark pieces of evidence to consider:
Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the his-
torical background of the decision under challenge, the
specific series of events leading to the enactment or offi-
cial policy in question, and the legislative or administrative
history, including contemporaneous statements made by
members of the decisionmaking body.' 25
119. See id. at 389 (summarizing secondary effects doctrine).
120. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 362-63 (stating rarity of animal cruelty cases
in Supreme Court docket).
121. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 525-27 (1993) (providing background of case and underlying controversy).
In the Santeria religion, animal sacrifices are performed at birth, marriage, and
death rites; to cure the sick; to initiate new members and religious leaders; and
during annual celebration. See id. at 524-25 (listing milestones involving animal
sacrifice). Animals subjected to sacrifice include chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks,
guinea pigs, goats, sheep, and turtles. See id. (showing range of animals subjected
to sacrifice).
122. See id. at 527 (discussing attorney general motivation).
123. See id. at 535 (accepting City's justifications as legitimate). The Court did
not decide if the interests were compelling. See id. (relying on City's stated
justifications).
124. See id. at 540 (providing guidance for courts determining legislative
intent).
125. Id. It is through these avenues of study that a court can assess discrimina-
tory objectives. See id. (classifying objective standards for determining legislative
purpose).
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Nevertheless, after analyzing the evidence, the Court held that the
City's legitimate interests in protecting public health and prevent-
ing animal cruelty could be achieved without a flat ban on the relig-
ious sacrificial practice.126
The Court comprehensively set forth standards for strict scru-
tiny regarding content-based regulations of speech in United States
v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.'2 7 The federal statute in ques-
tion effectively forced Playboy to broadcast its material during cer-
tain hours of the day when it was unlikely children would be
watching television, irrespective of whether other times of day were
suitable for the material. 1 2  The statute regulated the content of
the speech and the direct impact it supposedly had on viewers,
which, according to the Court, is the essence of presumptively void,
content-based regulations. 2 9
Utilizing the traditional strict scrutiny standard used in con-
tent-based regulation cases, the Court noted that the statute must
be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government inter-
est.13 0 Should a less restrictive alternative arise, the government is
obliged to utilize it, unless it can prove that the alternative would be
ineffective to achieve stated goals.' 3
Clarifying even further, the Court opined that the objectives of
"1shield [ing] the sensibilities of listeners ... [and] children does not
suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be accom-
plished by less restrictive alternative." 3 2 Interestingly, the Court
justified its decision by setting forth various theoretical interests be-
hind the right of free speech. 3" The Court stated:
126. See id. at 538 (condemning City's measures as overly restrictive).
127. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-19
(2000) (formalizing Supreme Court strict scrutiny analysis precedent).
128. See id. at 806-11 (explaining background of controversy).
129. See id. at 811-12, 817 (proscribing unjustified content-based restrictions
on speech). The regulation was specifically targeted towards the supposed effect
Playboy's content would have on young viewers. See id. at 811 (noting Congres-
sional intent).
130. See id. at 813 (reiterating strict scrutiny test). In a strict scrutiny analysis,
the government has the burden of establishing a compelling interest that is nar-
rowly tailored. See id. (distributing the burden of proof in a strict scrutiny case).
131. See id. at 813, 816 (implying importance of government consideration of
alternative means).
132. Id. at 814.
133. See id. at 817 (recognizing interests associated with First Amendment pro-
tection); see also Reynolds, supra note 4, at 354-66 (linking animal cruelty to theo-
ries supporting free speech); Anclien, supra note 1, at 34-48 (describing First
Amendment policy interests).
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It is through speech that our convictions and beliefs are
influenced, expressed, and tested. It is through speech
that we bring those beliefs to bear on government and on
society. It is through speech that our personalities are
formed and expressed. The citizen is entitled to seek out
or reject certain ideas or influences without government
interference or control.134
After reviewing evidence of various less restrictive alternatives, the
Court concluded that the statute did not serve compelling govern-
ment interests that were narrowly tailored. 3 5
C. Limiting Inclination to Carve Out New Categories of
Unprotected Speech
Although occurring infrequently, when an overbreadth or
strict scrutiny analysis failed, the Court carved out several categories
of speech that were unworthy of receiving even the most minute
First Amendment protection. 3 6 As early as 1942, the Court opined
that there are certain well-defined and narrowly tailored classes of
speech that do not raise constitutional problems when regulated.' 3 7
In the fifty years following the Court's decision in Chaplinksy v. New
Hampshire, the Court would carve out several additional categories
of unprotected speech, adding to the lewd and obscene, the pro-
fane and libelous, and "fighting words."' 3 8 In Chaplinsky, the court
carved out an area of unprotected speech fqr speech that violates a
valid criminal statute.' 3 9 The Court's justification remained consis-
134. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817.
135. See id. at 827 (contending government failed to establish that restriction
was least restrictive alternative). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding content-based restrictions, see Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) and Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
136. See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 188-94 (providing background of Supreme
Court First Amendment cases).
137. See Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (recogniz-
ing categories of speech unworthy of First Amendment protection).
138. See id. at 572 (listing categories of unprotected speech as of 1942).
"Fighting" words are those "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite and immediate breach of the peace." Id. In 1969, the Court added a cate-
gory of unprotected speech for activities that incite violence. See Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
139. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571 (noting proper speech exclusions, despite
religious nature). In this case, the statute was narrowly drawn and limited to pun-
ishing conduct within state power. See id. at 573 (illustrating proper statutory
scope).
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tent in many of its later cases, classifying such categories of speech
as such "slight societal value" that any value in the speech is
trumped by "the social interest in order and morality."l 40
Several years after deciding Chaplinsky, the Court in Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co.'4 ' reaffirmed its conclusion that "the consti-
tutional freedom for speech and press [does not extend] its immu-
nity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute." 42 The Court recognized that
the freedoms advanced by the First Amendment are vital to Ameri-
can society, and speech that is deemed an inconvenience or annoy-
ance would not fall under the categories of properly regulated
speech.' 43 In an area that has been vehemently fought over and
repeatedly brought in front of the Supreme Court, the Court has
repeatedly reaffirmed that obscene speech should muster virtually
zero First Amendment protection.144
In the first case to confront the issue directly, Roth v. United
States, the Supreme Court firmly held that the First Amendment was
not intended to protect all forms of speech, particularly obscene
speech.' 4 5 Repeating earlier language used in Chaplinsky and
Giboney, the Court added that obscene material is that which "deals
with sex in a manner appealing to [a] prurient interest."' 4 6 Con-
tent dealing in or depicting sex alone does not guarantee rejection
under the First Amendment; it is sexual content appealing to the
prurient interest that raises constitutional issues.147 The Court pro-
vided guidance for lower courts faced with an obscenity statute like
the one in Roth.'14 It noted that the Constitution does not require
impossible standards; the language of a statute must be adequately
140. See id. at 572 (reviewing proper balance of speech value and societal
interests).
141. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
142. See id. (holding First Amendment does not exonerate when speech ma-
jor element of criminal statute).
143. See id. at 501-02 (reaffirming grave offenses against society cannot be
shielded from state control). In Giboney, the speech was used as "an essential and
inseparable part of a grave offense against an important public law" and was prop-
erly subjected to state regulation. See id. at 502 (applying categorical exception to
speech).
144. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (contending First
Amendment history implies that framers did not intend for obscenity to receive
First Amendment protection).
145. See id. at 483 (excluding obscenity from First Amendment protection).
146. See id. at 487 (defining obscenity).
147. See id. (emphasis added) (excluding non-obscene sexual portrayals from
Court scrutiny).
148. See id. at 491-92 (clarifying proper application of obscenity doctrine).
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specific and detailed to provide warning to a party contemplating
an act that would violate the statute.14 9
Almost twenty years later, the Court narrowed its obscenity
doctrine in Miller v. California5is, which, like Roth, concerned a state
obscenity statute and its application to a citizen.' 5 ' While maintain-
ing the "prurient interest" language, the Court narrowed the ob-
scenity doctrine to reach only those offenses that "taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct
in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' 52 The
obscenity doctrine paved the way for the Court to carve out an addi-
tional category of unprotected speech for child pornography.' 5 3 In
1982, the case of N. Y. v. Ferber came before the Supreme Court after
a bookkeeper was convicted under a statute criminalizing the sale
of child pornography.154 The Court's five-part discussion in Ferber
would eventually become the basis for its decision in Stevens thirty
years later.'5 5 In analyzing the statute, the Court granted the legis-
lature significant deference in its decision-making because the legis-
lature relied on research and literature discussing the harmful
effects of child pornography on both children and society.' 56
The Court's most influential argument, which it later rejected
in Stevens, was that the distribution of child pornography is "intrinsi-
cally related" to the abuse itself. '' The Court emphasized that en-
suring the physical and mental well-being of children is undeniably
149. See id. (standardizing application of obscenity doctrine). The Court
stated that the language would be measured by "common understanding and prac-
tices." See id. at 491 (noting standard for measurement).
150. Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
151. See id. (narrowing scope of obscenity doctrine to "works which depict or
describe sexual conduct").
152. Id. at 24. The trier of fact must look at the work as a whole to determine
if an average person applying current community standards would find that the
work appeals to a prurient interest. See id. (discussing guidelines for analyzing sup-
posed obscene works). They must also determine if the work depicts or describes
offensive sexual conduct that would fall under state law, and they must judge
whether the work has redeeming value in any of the categories specified by the
Supreme Court. See id. (reciting steps for trier of fact conducting an obscenity
analysis).
153. See N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1982) (discussing state interests
regarding well-being of minors and relevance of legislative judgment).
154. See id. at 751-52 (stating background of case).
155. For a further discussion of the Court's analysis concerning Ferber, see in-
fra notes 218-222 and accompanying text.
156. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 (relying on legislative research regarding harms
to children resulting from participation in child pornography).
157. See id. at 759 (comparing conduct to its depiction). The Court's first
reason was that videos and photographs are a permanent record of the conduct, a
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a compelling state interest, as children form the basis for future
societal growth and success.158 The Court noted that to combat the
conduct itself, the distribution network for such content must be
eradicated.' 5
The most expeditious if not the only practical method of
law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this ma-
terial by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons
selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.
Thirty-five States and Congress have concluded that re-
straints on the distribution of pornographic materials are
required in order to effectively combat the problem, and
there is a body of literature and testimony to support these
legislative conclusions.16 0
Furthermore, embodying its rationale in Giboney, the Court con-
cluded that the advertising and selling of child pornography pro-
vides an economic motive for people to produce the material, and
thus, the marketing of such conduct is an "integral part" of the pro-
duction of the materials. 6 1
The Court also undertook a balancing test, opining that the
value of the material is "de minimis."' 62 It did not find merit that
child pornography could classify as scientific, educational, or artis-
tic.' 63 Recognizing the importance of precedent in formulating a
decision, the Court noted that carving out a new category of unpro-
tected speech for child pornography would not offend earlier deci-
sions.164 This is especially important considering that the Court's
decision in Ferber would form the basis for its later decision in Ste-
record that only serves to exacerbate the harm suffered. See id. (arguing exacerba-
tion of harm due to permanent video record).
158. See id. (contending obviousness of compelling state interest in protecting
children from harm).
159. See id. (opining closure of distribution network is most effective means of
combating underlying harm).
160. Id. at 760.
161. See id. at 761 (quoting language from Giboney regarding lack of constitu-
tional protection for speech used as integral part of violating criminal statute).
The Court also emphasized the illegal nature of the conduct, which is prohibited
throughout the United States. See id. (emphasizing nationwide illegality of child
pornography).
162. See id. at 762 (arguing value of depictions is less than exceedingly
modest).
163. See id. at 762-63 (recognizing possibility for including person of legal age
in videos should literary value become feasible).
164. See id. at 763 (reviewing history of Supreme Court actions in carving out
categories of unprotected speech).
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vens.' 65 Ensuring that First Amendment freedoms are not unneces-
sarily trampled, the Court mandated that proscribable conduct
must be properly defined by state law, either "written or authorita-
tively construed."' 66 In fact, the Court has noted that it and other
courts often construe statutes specifically to avoid constitutional
problems.'67
Despite Stevens presenting the Court with the first comprehen-
sive case to concern the First Amendment in relation to the In-
ternet, the Court failed to regard the proliferation of the Internet
as a factor to consider when construing statutes.' 6 8 Yet, in Ashcroft
v. American Civil Liberties Union, a case decided eight years prior to
Stevens, the Court noted, "[t]he Internet . .. offer[s] a forum for a
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cul-
tural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity."16 s
The case surrounded the Child Online Protection Act, which pro-
hibited knowingly transmitting inappropriate and harmful material
over the Internet that could be accessed by minors. 70 Unfortu-
nately, with the benefits of the Internet come the dangers of rapid
dissemination and proliferation of materials across the web, ena-
bling child pornography and other inappropriate or offensive con-
duct to spread like wildfire.' 7 ' Therefore, the Internet presents
problems to both regulating distribution of materials and prohibit-
ing certain conduct all together, and the Court concluded it must
approach the substantive issues from a modern angle contemplat-
ing contemporary standards.'72 Although the Court had not fully
confronted the issue of the Internet in relation to the categories
165. For a further discussion of the Court's analysis concerning Ferber, see in-
fra notes 218-222 and accompanying text.
166. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (mandating standard apply to both participant
age and definition of sexual conduct).
167. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119 (1990) (emphasis added) (re-
jecting Osborne's contention that statutes should not be construed to avoid consti-
tutional violations).
168. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002) (providing overview of
Internet's place in First Amendment analysis).
169. Id. at 566. The Court proceeded to discuss the freedom one has when
searching the Internet and the impressive range of materials one can discover
while searching. See id. (implying Court must consider all-encompassing nature of
Internet in First Amendment controversies).
170. See id. at 569 (discussing application of Child Online Protection Act).
171. See id. at 566-67 (describing heightened harm from rapid dissemination).
The Court commented that while people can access content intentionally, often
people stumble across horrid materials accidentally and without warning. See id.
(discussing harm of Internet access).
172. See id. (reevaluating standards for analysis from modern perspective).
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unworthy of First Amendment protection, the Court tackled the is-
sue in Stevens.173
D. A Brief Glimpse into the "Entertainment" of Animal Cruelty
In a dim cellar, two dogs are forced into a pit. Outside the
pit's plywood walls, a crowd places bets. What comes next
is what the dogs have been trained for all their short, mis-
erable lives. The fight, which is just starting, will be brutal.
It will last a long time. No one will call for help. An hour
passes before one dog loses. He sinks into a corner, head
and body covered with wounds. He will not survive. The
other, also painfully injured, won't recover either. His
owner takes the prize, a pocketful of cash, and leaves the
2-year-old dog to die.174
Dogfighting has been a "sport" since the twelfth century, popular-
ized in the aftermath of the Roman invasion of Britain. 75 Cur-
rently, an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 people in the United States
engage in professional dogfighting, a multi-billion dollar industry
that is considered a felony in almost every state.76 The illegal in-
dustry is fueled by the massive sums of money that promoters and
participants earn by winning a fight.' 77 The average fight nets
around $10,000, but a top fight can pay upwards of $100,000.178
Animal fighting expert John Goodwin explains the industry: " [y]ou
173. See generally United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (analyzing
Internet in First Amendment framework).
174. The Dangers of Dogfighting, KIND NEWS ONLINE, (Jan., 2008), http://www.
kindnews.org/feature/2008/feature-janO8.asp (on file with author).
175. See American Society, supra note 4 (describing British fondness of pitting
their dogs against wild boar and bulls). After the use of larger animals was out-
lawed in 1835, fighters found that pitting their dogs against each other was a
cheaper, legal alternative to using large animals. See id. (explaining transition
from dog against large animal competitors to dog against dog matches). The sport
made its way to the United States during the 1800s. See American Society, supra
note 4 (noting initiation of dogfighting in the United States).
176. See Dogfighting a booming business, experts say, CNN U.S. (July 18, 2007),
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-07-18/us/dog.fighting_1-illegal-blood-sport-under
ground-dogfighting-magazines-animal-shelters?_s=pm:us [hereinafter Dogfighting
a Booming] (providing overview of modern dogfighting business); see also Frank
Deford, Beyond Vick: Animal Cruelty for Sport, NPR (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyid=12568999 (commenting on Humane Soci-
ety estimation of dogfighting industry size); Kelly Naqi, Source: Vick 'One of the
Heavyweights' in Dogfighting, ESPN (May 31, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/
news/story?id=2884063 (discussing proliferation of illegal fighting).
177. See Dogfighting a Booming, supra note 176 (reporting growth of dogfight-
ing despite its prohibition in all fifty states).
178. See id. (estimating prize sums); see also Naqi, supra note 176 (illustrating
lure of dogfighting).
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have an organized infrastructure for what is a criminal industry."179
Dog fighters and enthusiasts publish around twelve underground
magazines and around six registries to advertise fight locations, out-
comes, and training tools. 80
Dogfighting is highly elusive because matches take place on
farms or other properties in rural areas, and participants station
"lookouts" in the surrounding areas to warn of intruders or police
presence.'8 ' The sport is often synonymous with other criminal ac-
tivity like gambling, drugs, prostitution, and illegal firearms.' 82 A
Louisiana state trooper commented, "[t] he drugs and weapons as-
sociated with [the] sport are unbelievable."8 3 Often, children are
present at these events, either as spectators or participants in the
wagering process.184
Dogfighting causes considerable harm to the animals in-
volved.'8 5 The most widely used dogs are pit bulls.186 To train the
dogs to fight, trainers force dogs to run on makeshift treadmills for
extended periods of time, file their teeth to a sharp point, and pack
ground up glass in the dogs' fur before a fight.'8 7 Goodwin stated
that "[t]he gameness that the dog fighters strive for - and 'game-
ness' is the willingness to continue fighting, even in the face of ex-
179. Id.
180. See id. (summarizing business aspects of dog fighting). The Sporting
Dog Journal is considered the leading magazine for dogfighting enthusiasts with
over 3,000 subscribers. See Tom Weir, Vick Case Sheds Light on Dark World ofDogfight-
ing, USA TODAY (July 26, 2007, 7:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/foot-
ball/nfl/falcons/2007-07-18-vick-cover n.htm (reiterating size of industry).
"Police say copies of the magazine commonly are found at raid sites because it
tracked breeding lines and performances in 1,500-2,000 fights a year." Id.
181. See Dogfighting a Booming, supra note 176 (noting lookouts can be sta-
tioned as far as eight miles away from fight locations).
182. See Illegal Animal Fighting, Pir-AnusE.coM, http://www.pet-abuse.com/
pages/animal-cruelty/animal-fighting.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (listing dan-
gers associated with dogfights).
183. Weir, supra note 180.
184. See Illegal Animal Fighting, supra note 182 (discussing use of children as
"runners" during matches). "[T]oddler-sized chairs and nearby milk and cookies
suggest some people consider dogfighting family entertainment." Weir, supra note
180. "Dog fighting promotes crime, such as cruelty to animals, violence to others,
theft, drug use/possession/distribution, illegal weapons use/possession, and gam-
bling." Dog Fighting, supra note 39.
185. See Dog Fighting, supra note 39 (describing effects of dogfighting on
animal participants).
186. See id. (emphasizing extreme danger to adults and children).
187. See Tori Richards, Pit Bull Dogfighting Compound Raided in LA; 17 Dogs
Rescued, AOL ORIGINAL (Mar. 3, 2011, 3:37 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2011/
03/03/pit-bull-dogfighting-compound-raided-in-la-17-dogs-rescued/ (reporting
horrors found during raid on dogfight compound); see also Weir, supra note 180
(describing dog cruelty discovered during dogfighting raids).
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treme pain, even in the face of death - is something that's bred into
the dogs."'
The post-fight environment provides little improvement for
the animals.' 89 The kennels used to house dogs are frequently cov-
ered in blood from untreated wounds. 90 Commonly, if a dog sur-
vives a lost fight, he will be electrocuted, shot, hung, or burned.' 9 '
Any dogs fortunate to survive long enough to exit the dog fighting
industry suffer irreparable physical and emotional scars.19 2
In what is surely the most well publicized, but by no means the
first, illustration of the dogfighting industry, then Atlanta Falcon
star quarterback Michael Vick was charged with animal fighting in
2007.'os On April 25, 2007, during a search of Vick's Surry County,
Virginia property, police discovered sixty-six dogs, rape stands, pry
bars, treadmills, and bloodstains, all evidence of a comprehensive
dogfight operation. 94 Investigators later discovered that Vick had
trained over 2,000 dogs during his thirty-year involvement in the
industry.'95 He was sentenced to twenty-three months in prison.196
The NFL responded swiftly, denouncing its players' participa-
tion in any dog fighting activities and assuring that it would thor-
188. Naqi, supra note 176.
189. See Weir, supra note 180 (summarizing housing environment for fight
dogs).
190. See id. (describing inhuman conditions).
191. See id. (quoting findings of Washington state animal control officer).
192. See Richards, supra note 187 ("It's very difficult to rehab the animals be-
cause it's hard to turn them into loving pets after such a traumatic experience.").
193. See James Alder, Michael Vick Dogfighting Scandal, AwoUT.COM, http://
football.about.com/od/teamsfalcons/i/Michael-Vick.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2011) (outlining Vick's crimes). Vick was charged with "conspiracy to travel in
interstate commerce in aid of unlawful activities and to sponsor a dog in an animal
fighting venture." Id. Vick operated a dogfight operation named "Bad Newz Ken-
nels." See Trish Turner, Michael De Dora Jr. & The Associated Press, Michael Vick
Dogfighting Case Makes Way to Floor of U.S. Senate, Fox NEWS (July 19, 2007), http://
www.foxnews.com/printer friendly-story/0,3566,290061,00.html (summarizing
Senate discussion of Vick case). Notably, former NBA forward Qyntel Woods and
former NFL running back LeShon Johnson were also convicted of charges stem-
ming from animal abuse. See Naqi, supra note 176 (questioning proliferation of
dogfighting amongst professional athletes).
194. See Alder, supra note 193 (providing timeline of Vick investigation).
195. See Naqi, supra note 176 (evidencing long history of Vick's dogfights).
196. SeeJuliet Macur, Vick Receives 23 Months and a Lecture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/sports/football/lvick.html?-r=2
(commenting on harsh punishment handed down by U.S. District Court Judge
Henry E. Hudson). Interestingly, Robert Stevens's sentence was fourteen months
longer than Vick's, even though Vick actually participated in the dogfights. See
Adam Liptak, Free Speech Battle Arises from Dog Fighting Videos, N.Y. TIMs, Sept. 18,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/us/19scotus.html?pagewanted=print
(relating Stevens's case to publicized instances of dogfighting).
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oughly investigate and punish any proof of the crime.' 9 7 Unlike the
animals used in his operation, the direct career repercussions for
Vick were short-lived as the Philadelphia Eagles quickly signed Vick
upon his release from prison.'98
Aside from the postulated subculture of dogfighting in the ath-
letic profession, examples of animal cruelty are rampant in contem-
porary entertainment culture. 9 Goodwin believes "that certain
elements of the pop culture have glamorized dogfighting and glam-
orized big, tough pit bulls."2o1 Examples of celebrity disregard for
animals include: Kim Kardashian holding a kitten by its scruff, Paris
Hilton and her seeming lack of concern for her pets, Cesar Millan
and his training techniques, Jesse James and DMX caught dogfight-
ing, and even Prince Harry who was accused of mistreating his polo
horse.20 1
Currently, Mike Tyson is facing scrutiny for his new series "Tak-
ing on Tyson," which depicts Tyson's adventures in pigeon rac-
ing.2 02 PETA claims that "racing pigeons are forced to fly hundreds
of miles in all weather extremes as they attempt to get home, and
are vulnerable to both natural predators such as hawks and cruel
197. See Naqi, supra note 176 ("Dogfighting is cruel, degrading, and illegal.
We support a thorough investigation into any allegations of this type of activity.
Any NFL employee proved to be involved in this type of activity will be subject to
prompt and significant discipline under our personal conduct policy.").
198. See Patrik Jonsson, In Philadelphia, a Michael Vick Atlanta Never Knew,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 22, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/
0922/In-Philadelphia-a-Michael-Vick-Atlanta-never-knew (summarizing reasons for
Vick's comeback and reputation renewal).
199. See Olivia Allin, 10 Celebrities Accused of Mistreating Animals, THE FRISKY
(Apr. 21, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://www.thefrisky.com/post/246-10-celebrities-ac-
cused-of-mistreating-animals (listing popular celebrities accused of mistreating
animals).
200. Naqi, supra note 176.
201. See Allin, supra note 199 (outlining various accusations against celebrities
regarding their treatment of animals); see alsoJane Lasky, Prince Harry: Animal Cru-
elty Charges Pending Against Him, EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 4, 2010, 4:42 PM), http://
www.examiner.com/celebrity-headlines-in-national/prince-harry-animal-cruelty-
charges-pending-against-him-photos (criticizing Harry neglecting horse); Associ-
ated Press, DMX arrested on drug, animal cruelty charges, TODAY (May 9, 2008, 4:49
PM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/cleanprint/cleanprintproxy.aspx?1300135574
291 (detailing arrest and charges relating to dogfighting). But see Celebrities Who
Love Animals, ANIMAlS MATTER Too!, http://www.animalsmattertoocom/celebri-
ties.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (listing over one-hundred celebrities who advo-
cate on behalf of animal rights).
202. See David Moye, PETA Protests Mike Tyson Pigeon Show, AOL ORIGINAL
(Mar. 9, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2011/03/09/peta-protests-
mike-tysons-pigeon-racing-tv-show/ (discussing PETA accusations).
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humans who view them as 'pests."' 203 Conduct aside, Tyson's new
show reflects a growing trend of television networks' inclination to
air programming that contains what many consider animal
cruelty. 204
Another example, the Discovery Channel's Man vs. Wild, has
been likened to crush videos.205 The host, Bear Grylls, has caught
and bludgeoned a snake to death, consumed a live fish, and decapi-
tated and consumed a small snake, all without provocation from the
animals. 206 From dogfighting among athletes to cruelty on family
programming, one can illustrate hundreds of examples of animal
abuse in the current sports and entertainment realm. 207 The esca-
lating issue came to a head in United States v. Stevens.208
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
1. Steadfast Reluctance to Carve Out New Categorical Exception to Free
Speech
Before striking down § 48 as facially invalid, the Court briefly
entertained the government's primary argument that the class of
depictions of animal cruelty reached by the statute are categorically
unprotected by the First Amendment. 209 Because § 48 regulates
speech based on content, the Court restated its holding that con-
tent-based regulations of speech are presumptively void.2 10 Review-
ing past precedent, the Court described the limited areas of
content-based speech that are subject to restriction without raising
constitutional problems: obscenity, fraud, incitement, and speech
integral to criminal conduct.21'
203. Id. Pigeons are conditioned to fly up to six hundred miles at forty-five
miles per hour, and a prized pigeon can sell for up to $140,000. See id. (comment-
ing on motivation behind pigeon racing).
204. See Michael Mountain , Discovery Channel's Crush Videos, AL-CREATURES.
ORO, http://www.all-creatures.org/articles/ar-channel.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2011) (lamenting Discovery Channel's acceptance of animal show host behaviors).
205. See id. (struggling to distinguish between show and illegal crush videos).
206. See id. (pleading with Discovery Channel to cancel its troubling
programming).
207. See supra notes 193-206 and accompanying text for further discussion of
animal cruelty in pop culture and athletics.
208. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (addressing conten-
tion between depictions of animal cruelty and First Amendment).
209. See id. at 1584 (entertaining government contention regarding animal
cruelty as a class).
210. See id. at 1584 (reiterating government's burden to rebut presumption).
211. See id. (reviewing prior precedent concerning categorical exclusions);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defamation); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
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The government argued that depictions of animal cruelty lack
"expressive value" and are thus not only subject to regulation but
are entirely outside of the realm of First Amendment protection all
together. 212 While the Court found merit in the long history of
Americans' condemnation of animal cruelty, it was unable to glean
similar abhorrence for depictions of animal cruelty. 213 Relying on
the legislature's finding that depictions of animal cruelty have de
minimis redeeming value, the government proposed a balancing
test for categorical exclusions: "[w]hether a given category of
speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a cate-
gorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal
costs." 214 The government evidenced the Court's own language
that the interest in prohibiting certain "evil" speech is so over-
whelming that the balance of allowing expressive speech is inher-
ently struck.2 15 The Court quickly rejected the argument,
describing the government's balancing test as "startling and danger-
ous."216 The Court said when it recognizes categorical exceptions,
it does not do so based on a cost-benefit balancing test.2t 7
The Court relied on its analysis in Ferber to distinguish the type
of speech in that case, child pornography, against the depictions of
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949) (speech integral to criminal conduct); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (fraud). For further discussion of the
Court's precedent in this area, see supra notes 109-173 and accompanying text.
212. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (discussing government classification of
animal cruelty within First Amendment framework). The Court classified these
realms of unprotected speech as "'First Amendment Free Zone [s]'" (quoting Bd.
of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987)). See id. (rejecting
government's argument that depictions of animal cruelty fall into unprotected
realm).
213. See id. (emphasis added) (drawing distinction between depictions of ab-
horred acts). The government contended that exemptions from First Amendment
protection have long been recognized without any historical tradition of regula-
tion in those areas. See id. (imploring Court to rely on legislative judgment in the
area).
214. Id. The government pointed to precedent describing categorical excep-
tions as "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity." Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
215. See id. at 1586 (illustrating precedent employing balancing test).
216. See id. at 1585 (condemning government balancing test). The Court re-
jected the idea that only categories of speech that satisfy an ad hoc balancing test
against social costs and benefits should be permitted. See id. (reiterating invalidity
of straight balancing).
217. See id. at 1586 (pointing to Ferbes strict scrutiny analysis).
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animal cruelty before the Court.2 18 It reaffirmed the government's
compelling interest in protecting children from abuse and empha-
sized the overwhelmingly minimal value of the speech in Ferber.219
Furthermore, the Court distinguished Ferber because the market for
child pornography was "intrinsically related" to the abuse and was
"an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity
illegal throughout the Nation."2 20 The Court restated that speech
used as an integral part of violating a criminal statute rarely receives
constitutional protection.221 Failing to draw any comparison be-
tween the speech in Ferber and the speech prohibited by § 48, the
Court concluded its categorical exception analysis by recognizing
that there may be areas of speech not yet classified by the Court as
worthy of receiving a categorical exception, but that depictions of
animal cruelty are not among the worthy few.2 22
2. Overreaching Statutory Coverage: Facial Invalidity Claim
Declining to carve out a categorical exception for depictions of
animal cruelty, the Court proceeded to analyze Stevens's claim that
any conviction secured under § 48 is unconstitutional and facially
invalid.223 The Court reiterated the test for facially invalid claims,
stating that Stevens would have to prove "that no set of circum-
stances exists under which [§ 48] would be valid . . . or that the
statute lacks 'any plainly legitimate sweep."22 4 The Court also estab-
lished its second approach to facial invalidity claims, stating a law
may be invalidated as overbroad if "a substantial number of its ap-
plications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep."2 25
Each side argued the facial invalidity claim in light of these two
approaches. 226 Stevens argued that § 48 reaches lawful and unlaw-
ful activities equally and is thus overbroad.227 The government em-
218. See id. (contending analysis did not rest on balancing of opposing
interests).
219. See id. (reviewing Ferberjustifications).
220. Id.
221. See id. (grounding analysis on well-established categories of unprotected
speech).
222. See id. (declining proposition to grant itself "freewheeling" authority to
carve out categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection based on govern-
ment's "highly manipulable" balancing test).
223. See id. at 1586-87 (introducing facial invalidity challenge).
224. Id. at 1587.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 1586-87 (setting forth comprehensive argument for facial
invalidity).
227. See id. (outlining permissible and impermissible reach of statute).
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phasized its narrow interpretation of the statute as reaching only
"extreme" materials.228 It argued that the statute is plainly legiti-
mate in the realm of crush videos and depictions of animal fight-
ing.2 2 Presented with these two arguments, the Court's ultimate
determination rested on how broadly it construed the statute.230
First, the Court undertook to construe the statute to define its
coverage.231 The Court's first line of attack was directed at the lan-
guage of the statute.232 It noted that while the terms "maimed,"
"mutilated," and "tortured" do imply a degree of cruelty,
"wounded," and "killed" do not.233 Due to these word choices, the
Court concluded that the text does not require any element of cru-
elty in the depictions. 234 The government responded by evincing a
common canon of statutory construction, that "an ambiguous term
may be 'given more precise content by the neighboring words with
which it is associated.' "235 The Court disagreed, concluding that
§ 48 contains little ambiguity, and the terms should be construed
according to their ordinary meanings, not in relation to each
other.23 6
The Court then rejected the government's contention that
§ 48 requires that the acts depicted be illegal, and there is no risk of
innocent conviction under the statute.23 7 The Court reasoned that
the statute fails to clarify why certain intentional killings are made
illegal, and the statute is not limited to violations of laws specifically
228. See id. at 1587 (weighing Stevens's argument that § 48 applies to ordi-
nary, lawful depictions against government's contention that statute should be nar-
rowly construed).
229. See id. (arguing validity of § 48). The government contended that § 48
has a plainly legitimate sweep and covers several circumstances under which the
statute is valid. See id. (applying § 48 to overbreadth precedent).
230. See id. (construing statute to determine its reach).
231. See id. at 1587-88 (citing language derived from Williams overbreadth
analysis). The Court opined that it would be impossible to classify a statute as
overbroad before first deciding how far it reaches. See id. at 1587 (reaffirming
content of overbreadth doctrine). As § 48 is a federal statute, the Court noted it
was unnecessary to defer to the state court's interpretation of its own law. See id. at
1588 (justifying Court's head-on approach to interpretation).
232. See id. (conducting word-by-word analysis).
233. See id. (rejecting government interpretation of § 48). The government
proposed that the Court should construe statutory terms in relation to accompany-
ing language and in light of their respective meanings. See id. (analyzing govern-
ment's construction of § 48).
234. See id. (commenting on statute's "alarming breadth").
235. Id.
236. See id. (noting ordinary meanings of "wounded" and "killed" do not auto-
matically elicit cruel implications).
237. See id. (relying on state and federal animal laws that are not designed to
guard specifically against cruelty).
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targeted towards animal cruelty.23 8 Furthermore, the Court
evinced concern for the jurisdictional reach of the statute, opining
that a depiction of legal activity in one state would be subject to
regulation if later found in a state in which the conduct was ille-
gal.23" The Court was unwilling to allow the risk of someone legally
producing and distributing a video in his own state and later facing
prosecution for the video surfacing in another state through means
outside of the perpetrator's control. 240
The Court then analyzed the role of the exceptions clause in
narrowing the statute. 241 The government's interpretation of the
exclusions would include any material with "redeeming societal
value," "at least some minimal value," "or anything more than 'scant
societal value.' "242 Unfortunately for the government, the Court
read the term "serious value" to mean truly serious value, which
would not include any material with more than "scant societal
value." 243 The Court also noted that most speech would not fall
within the statute's exceptions because the instructional value of
certain videos is not immediately discernable. 244 The Court con-
cluded that it would have to take an "unrealistically broad reading"
of the statute's exception clause to uphold the law on this
ground.243
The government also attempted to rely on Miller when formu-
lating the statute's exceptions clause, a case which held that "'seri-
238. See id. at 1588-89 (resting analysis on examples of legal humane slaughter
and provisions designed to protect against endangered species).
239. See id. (showing concern for possible misapplication of statute). The
Court rested its analysis on the fact that there is substantial disagreement in Ameri-
can society as to what constitutes cruelty to animals. See id. at 1589 (recognizing
likelihood of broad societal consensus against animal cruelty and problem with
relying on consensus alone). The Court proceeded to review the animal cruelty
laws of several states, exemplifying its conclusion that the jurisdictional reach of
the statute is overly broad. See id. (listing range of animal laws in different states).
240. See id. (expressing concern for statute's overly broad jurisdictional
reach).
241. See id. at 1590 (reviewing applicability and reach of exceptions clause).
242. Id.
243. See id. (declining government's invitation for Court to rely on commonly
accepted meaning of "serious").
244. See id. (providing examples of nonobvious instructional videos). For ex-
ample, the Court relied on hunting videos and Spanish bullfights to illustrate its
point that it is difficult to classify content that has "serious" value and that which
does not. See id. (concluding statute cannot be adequately limited in scope).
245. See id. (explaining potential problems with government's overly limited
reading of exceptions clause).
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ous' value shields depictions of sex from regulation as obscenity." 246
The Court said its opinion in Miller did not imply that serious value
could be used to shield other kinds of speech because most speech
would not fall under the exceptions clause but are still subject to
First Amendment protection.24 7
In its final failed attempt to redeem the statute, the govern-
ment reassured the Court that the executive branch would invoke
its prosecutorial discretion and would only construe § 48 to reach
extreme cruelty. 248 The Court refused to honor the government's
assurance, stating, "[w] e would not uphold an unconstitutional stat-
ute merely because the government promised to use it respon-
sibly."249 The Court justified its unwillingness on Stevens's
conviction itself because despite President William J. Clinton's di-
rection that § 48 only target depictions "of wanton cruelty to ani-
mals designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex," Stevens's
videos did not remotely fit this description.250
The Court emphasized that under no circumstances would it
rewrite a law to conform to constitutional requirements. 25' There-
fore, the Court held that § 48 was substantially overbroad, and it
did not have occasion or necessity to decide whether a law targeted
specifically towards crush videos would satisfy constitutional
requirements.2 5 2
3. Court Muddles Application of Precedent: justice Alito Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Alito adopted a slightly different ap-
proach than the majority, but also addressed the Court's arguments
in his analysis of the statute.253 He disagreed with the majority in
the proposition that § 48 was enacted to suppress speech.2 5 4 In-
stead, Justice Alito argued § 48 was passed to prevent "horrific acts
246. See id. at 1591 (explaining government's reliance on Miller when formu-
lating § 48). For a further discussion of Miller, see supra note 151-152 and accom-
panying text.
247. See id. (determining serious value cannot act as general shield for
speech).
248. See id. (emphasis added) (criticizing government's promise).
249. Id.
250. See id. (interpreting President Clinton's statement as catch-all limitation
on statute's reach).
251. See id. at 1591-92 (noting risk of serious invasion of legislative domain).
252. See id. at 1592 (affirming Third Circuit judgment).
253. See id. at 1592-1602 (Alito,J., dissenting) (looking to intent behind enact-
ment of § 48).
254. See id. (Alito,J., dissenting) (proposing alternative construction of § 48).
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of animal cruelty," a form of entertainment with no social value.25"
He warned that the Court's decision had the effect of legalizing
crush videos and would likely precipitate a reemergence of the de-
praved depictions. 256 In his view, the Third Circuit should have di-
rectly decided whether § 48 was unconstitutional as applied to
Stevens's videos, instead of immediately holding the statute facially
invalid.257 Regardless, Justice Alito's dissent attacked the majority's
overbreadth analysis.258
Justice Alito's proposed approach to an overbreadth challenge
requires a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute to
show that the statute violates the challenger's own rights.2 5  There-
fore, it would be unnecessary to apply an overbreadth analysis if the
statute in question is unconstitutional as applied to the challenger
before the Court.260 Nevertheless, he did not believe that § 48 was
overbroad in the analysis employed by the majority.26'
Reaffirming the Court's interpretation of the overbreadth doc-
trine, Justice Alito discussed the balance to be struck and empha-
sized that the statute's overbreadth must be "substantiat' relative to
the statute's "plainly legitimate sweep."262 He listed three impor-
tant elements of the overbreadth challenge: that it be applied to
"real-world conduct, not fanciful hypotheticals"; that it be deter-
mined from the statute's text and "from actual fact"; and that "there
255. See id. at 1592 (Alito,J., dissenting) (predicting harmful effect of Court's
decision).
256. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (disclaiming Court's approach to analysis).
In fact, the Third Circuit's decision had that precise effect, and the Supreme
Court's decision will no doubt encourage a further proliferation of crush videos.
See also Anclien, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasizing reemergence of crush videos on
Internet in wake of Third Circuit decision).
257. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1593 (Alito, J., dissenting) (recognizing Court's
unwillingness to adopt Third Circuit's reasoning). Justice Alito would remand the
case for further review from the Third Circuit on the issue of the constitutionality
of Stevens's videos. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting alternative course of
action).
258. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (concluding § 48 does not ban substantial
amount of protected speech).
259. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing First Amendment exception to
general overbreadth rules).
260. See id. at 1593-94 (Alito, J., dissenting) (encouraging use of overbreadth
challenge as last resort).
261. See id. at 1594 (Alito,J., dissenting) (proposing flawed conclusion result-
ing from improper interpretation of § 48).
262. See id. (Alito,J., dissenting) (restating Williams's overbreadth doctrine in
regards to protected speech). "[T]he doctrine seeks to balance the 'harmful ef-
fects' of 'invalidating a law that in some of its applications is perfectly constitu-
tional' against the possibility that 'the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law
[will] dete[r] people from engaging in constitutionally protected speech.'" Id.
(AlitoJ., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)).
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must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly com-
promise recognized First Amendment protections."2 6 3 Justice Al-
ito's main quarrel with the majority's opinion rested in its failure to
decide whether § 48 was constitutional as applied to crush videos
and depictions of animal fights. 264 Instead, the Court concluded
that it was unconstitutional as applied to hunting videos and depic-
tions of animal slaughter for food. 265
Justice Alito evidenced serious flaws in the Court's interpreta-
tion of § 48 as applied to depictions of hunting activities. 266 First,
he noted that hunting is legal in all fifty states, and § 48 only ap-
plied to depictions that were illegal in the jurisdiction in which the
"depiction [was] created, sold, or possessed."26 7 Therefore, an
overwhelming majority of depictions of hunting activities would fall
outside of the statute's reach.268 Justice Alito's dissent then ad-
dressed the majority's contention that certain hunting activities are
illegal in some states and that hunting is banned completely in the
District of Columbia; thus, people selling depictions of certain ille-
gal or legal hunting acts in the wrong jurisdiction would be subject
to conviction under § 48.269 He said the Court was flawed in this
analysis because § 48 only applied to depictions of "animal cru-
elty."270 Justice Alito would interpret the statute to "apply only to
depictions involving acts of animal cruelty as defined by applicable
state or federal law, not to depictions of acts that happen to be ille-
gal for reasons having nothing to do with the prevention of animal
cruelty."27 1
Furthermore, even if by some stretch of the imagination legal
hunting activities came under the umbrella of § 48, Justice Alito
concluded that these depictions would fall within the exceptions
263. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (listing critical components of overbreadth
analysis).
264. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's scope of review).
265. See id. (Alito,J., dissenting) (assuming Court accepted statute's validity as
applied to depictions of dogfights and crush videos).
266. See id. at 1594-96 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's reliance on
hunting videos to demonstrate overbreadth of § 48).
267. See id. at 1594-95 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating Court's interpretation of
statute as applied to hunting videos is flawed because hunting is legal in all fifty
states).
268. See id. at 1595 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasizing majority's apparent
strain to find overbreadth).
269. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing flawed Court opinion).
270. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (modifying Court's construction of § 48).
271. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito discussed that most state laws ex-
clude wildlife and other legal hunting activities, so the statute would reach virtually
zero depictions of legal hunting activities. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (mention-
ing state specific definitions or exemptions).
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clause, because "the predominant view in this country has long
been that hunting serves many important values," and it is doubtful
Congress intended § 48 to reach hunting activities. 272 He con-
cluded by stating that even if there are isolated incidents where § 48
would reach legal hunting activities, these incidents are insubstan-
tial and do not indicate that § 48 bans a "substantial amount of pro-
tected speech" as required in an overbreadth challenge. 273
Justice Alito next considered § 48 as applied to depictions of
legal animal slaughter, specifically slaughter for food purposes, and
set out two reasons why these depictions did not warrant an over-
breadth analysis.274 Similar to his argument for depictions of hunt-
ing activities, Justice Alito again emphasized that § 48 only reached
depictions of animal cruelty, and animal cruelty laws typically do
not cover depictions of legal animal slaughters or tail docking of
dairy cows. 275 Furthermore, these depictions would likely classify as
having educational or journalistic value, forcing them into the ex-
ceptions clause of § 48.276 The "veritable sliver of unconstitutional-
ity" of a small subset of these videos would not be sufficient to strike
down § 48 in its entirety.2 7 7
In his next approach, Justice Alito discussed crush videos spe-
cifically to argue that § 48 has "a substantial core of constitutionally
permissible applications." 278 Reviewing the basis for Congress's ini-
tiative in passing § 48, Justice Alito pointed out that the underlying
conduct in crush videos is unquestionably subject to prohibition
but is extremely difficult to prosecute based on the nature of crush
272. See id. at 1595-96 (Alito, J., dissenting) (reviewing presidential and con-
gressional acts illustrating American's general acceptance and admiration for
hunting activities).
273. See id. at 1596 (Alito, J., dissenting) (reiterating requirement that chal-
lenged statute intrude upon substantial amount of protected speech).
274. See id. at 1596-97 (Alito, J., dissenting) (continuing comprehensive re-
view of Court's examples of § 48 restricting speech).
275. See id. at 1597 (Alito, J., dissenting) (summarizing state statutes exclud-
ing humane slaughter and practices undertaken as ordinary dairy farming
activities).
276. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting depictions of animal slaughters
for food or tail docking would easily qualify under exceptions clause). Justice Alito
envisioned videos showing the proper method of tail docking or news pieces re-
garding the inhumane treatment of animals. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting
clear lack of substantial overbreadth).
277. See id. (Alito,J., dissenting) (emphasizing Court's duty to interpret stat-
utes specifically to avoid "serious constitutional concerns").
278. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (introducing statute's plainly legitimate
sweep).
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videos.279 Thus, the only effective means of combating the underly-
ing conduct was to prohibit the commercial sales of the videos. 280
Not insignificantly, Justice Alito noted the overwhelming success of
§ 48, both domestically and internationally, at destroying the crush
video industry.28' Furthermore, Justice Alito emphasized the subse-
quent reemergence of crush videos in the wake of the Third Cir-
cuit's decision.282
Resting his dissent on his analysis of Ferber, Justice Alito con-
cluded the Court's analysis of Ferber was misguided.28 3 First, similar
to the child pornography in Ferber, Justice Alito commented on the
inherent link between crush videos and violent criminal conduct, as
animal cruelty crimes are committed for the sole purpose of creat-
ing the videos. 284 He rejected the Court's disregard of Ferber, be-
cause "[t]he First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it
most certainly does not protect violent criminal conduct, even if
engaged in for expressive purposes."28 5 In his reasoning, Justice Al-
ito targeted three influential aspects of Ferber for comparison to
crush videos: the fact that child pornography inflicts severe injury
upon the videos' subjects; that the underlying crimes could not be
eradicated without targeting the videos themselves; and that the
value of child pornography is de minimis and greatly outweighed by
the underlying evil. 286
In comparison to crush videos, Justice Alito first pointed out
that the conduct depicted in crush videos is illegal in all fifty states
and inflicts severe injury and excruciating pain, ultimately resulting
in the death of its subjects. 28 7 Secondly, the acts depicted in crush
279. See id. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting) (implying displeasure with Court's
lack of deference to legislative judgment). Justice Alito noted the intentional
shielding of the women torturers and the difficulty in identifying the location of
video production for jurisdictional purposes. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (listing
challenges to prosecution).
280. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (restating legislative justifications for passing§ 48).
281. See id. (Alito, J. dissenting) (reviewing post- § 48 statistics).
282. See id. (Alito, J. dissenting) (praising overwhelming success of statute).
283. See id. at 1599 (Alito, J. dissenting) (emphasizing majority's misapplica-
tion of overbreadth analysis established in Ferber).
284. See id. (Alito, J. dissenting) (reevaluating legislature's reliance on
evidence).
285. Id. at 1598-99 (Alito, J. dissenting).
286. See id. at 1599-1600 (Alito, J. dissenting) (comparing Ferber child pornog-
raphy factors to crush videos and other depictions of animal cruelty).
287. See id. (Alito,J., dissenting) (arguing lack of First Amendment protection
for persons who commit cruelty acts). Those who record and sell the videos are
likely to be criminally culpable, as well as those who commission the production of
crush videos to meet individual fetishes. See id. at 1600 (Alito, J. dissenting) (fail-
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videos cannot effectively be prevented without prohibiting the
targeted conduct.2 8 8 Finally, like the conduct in Ferber, Justice Alito
noted the harm caused by the production of crush videos outweighs
any conceivable value the depictions may possess. 289 justice Alito
agreed with the Court that the harm to be prevented in crush
videos pales in comparison to the harm to be prevented from child
pornography.2 0 Yet, despite this considerable distinction, the gov-
ernment nonetheless has a "compelling interest" in preventing the
animal torture in crush videos and ensuring that criminals do not
profit from their heinous crimes. 291
Finally, Justice Alito also applied the Ferber framework to depic-
tions of violent animal fights, concluding that § 48 is constitutional
as applied.292 First, he repeated his comparison of Ferber to Ste-
vens's conduct by noting that depictions of dogfights, like crush
videos, "record the actual commission of a crime involving deadly
violence" and are illegal in all fifty states.293 Similarly, Congress
could, and did, properly conclude that the most effective method
of combating dogfights was to combat the depictions of the crimi-
nal acts, as the success of the dogfighting industry rests on the suc-
cess of the proliferation of the videos. 29 4 Thirdly, the depictions of
dogfights subject to conviction under § 48 have no discernable so-
ing to distinguish between those who commit acts and those who knowingly aid in
commission of those acts).
288. See id. (Alito, J. dissenting) (comparing difficulty in prosecuting animal
cruelty actors to hurdles when combating child pornography). The alternative to
banning the videos is tolerating the underlying criminal conduct, a choice Con-
gress was not willing to accept. See id. (Alito, J. dissenting) (praising government
actions in passing statute).
289. See id. (AlitoJ. dissenting) (confirming proper application of statute and
exceptions clause).
290. See id. (Alito, J. dissenting) (contending Court's conclusion rested on
distinction between animals and children).
291. See id. at 1600-01 (Alito, J. dissenting) (rejecting Third Circuit's second-
guessing of legislature's judgment). See also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 195-205 (ar-
guing for animal cruelty's inclusion in Court's acceptance of Son of Sam anti-profit
statutes).
292. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1601 (Alito, J., dissenting) (narrowing analysis
specifically to dogfights because of their commonality and relevance to Stevens's
case).
293. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (applying Ferber framework to § 48).
294. See id. (Alito, J. dissenting) (mentioning underground nature of crush
videos and dogfighting industry). As Justice Alito states, "[t]he commercial trade
in videos of dogfights is 'an integral part of the production of such materials."' See
id. (AlitoJ. dissenting) (citing N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747(1982)). Depictions of
dogfights "fuel the market for, and thus [perpetuate] the perpetration of, the
criminal conduct depicted in them." Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
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cial value.295 Finally, the long-lasting harm inflicted upon the dogs
greatly outweighs any appreciable social value the videos may con-
tain.296 Congress has a compelling interest in enforcing the na-
tion's criminal laws against animal cruelty and preventing criminals
from achieving monetary gain from their crimes. 29 7 In conclusion,
Justice Alito reemphasized that § 48 has "a substantial core of con-
stitutionally permissible applications" and that Stevens did not meet
his burden of establishing that the statute's impermissible applica-
tions are "substantial" when compared to its "plainly legitimate
sweep."298
B. Critical Analysis
1. Faulty Application of Content-Based Speech Precedent
The Court only briefly considered the issue of the statute as a
content-based restriction on speech necessitating the application of
strict scrutiny, but the case law suggests a different approach more
appropriate for the content of § 48.299 The Court's analysis in this
regard suggests an evolving view of the type of restriction that quali-
fies as content-based versus content-neutral.30o Typically, a content-
based restriction on speech is one that restricts speech because of
the message that is expressed.3 o' Yet, it is difficult to discern the
message that is expressed in either crush videos or dogfighting
videos like those in StevenS.302 These videos are not produced as a
295. See id. at 1602 (Alito, J. dissenting) (noting exceptions clause exempts
material with appreciable social value).
296. See id. (Alito,J. dissenting) (referring to "trifling value" depictions argua-
bly possess).
297. See id. (Alito, J. dissenting) (opining Congress's compelling interest in
passing § 48).
298. See id. (Alito,J. dissenting) (concluding § 48 is not overbroad as applied
by majority).
299. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 372-81 (reviewing Supreme Court case law
specific to strict scrutiny analysis). For a further discussion of the Court's strict
scrutiny review, see supra notes 109-135 and accompanying text.
300. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 372-81 (describing Supreme Court case law
specific to strict scrutiny analysis). See also Recent Case, Constitutional Law - First
Amendment - En Banc Third Circuit Strikes Down Federal Statute Prohibiting the Inter-
state Sale of Depictions of Animal Cruelty, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1239, 1245 (2009) (criti-
cizing Third Circuit's application of case law). It should be noted that the
Supreme Court followed the Third Circuit's reasoning in this respect. For a fur-
ther discussion, see supra notys 209-222 and accompanying text.
301. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 356 (defining content-based restrictions on
speech). For further discussion of the Court's content-based jurisprudence, see
supra notes 109-135 and accompanying text.
302. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 46-48 (attempting to discern possible expres-
sive value contained in crush videos); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Animal Legal
Defense Fund in Support of Petitioner at 5, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct.
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means of advancing a political, social, or moral viewpoint, and it is
perplexing to discern a motive besides economic reward. 03 The
videos exist purely because of a commercial market that supports
their production.304 Additionally, even if the depictions, in some
form, evince an expressive message, the content would be beyond
the reach of § 48 which exempts protected messages.30 5 The
Court's analysis of the issue seems at odds with its reasoning in
RA. V., Church of the Lukumi, and Playboy.3 06
The justifications for the right of free speech outlined in Play-
boy fail to justify why the Court classified § 48 as a content-based
restriction on speech.307 Crush videos and dogfighting videos do
not influence, express, or test people's convictions and beliefs; they
do not bring beliefs to bear on government and society; they do not
contribute to the development of personality; and they do not aid
the citizenry in seeking out and rejecting ideas.30 The videos are
driven by pure economic motive void of any speech or conduct wor-
thy of First Amendment protection. 0"
1577 (2009) (No. 08-769) [hereinafter Brief of Animal Legal Defense] (arguing
depictions of animal cruelty contain no expressive content, and § 48 does not
criminalize protected speech). The Animal Legal Defense Fund employs the legal
system to advance animal interests and protect animal lives. See id. at I (describing
background of interest in amicus curiae). "This statute has nothing to do with the
offense of the message. It has to do with trying to dry up an underlying market for
animal cruelty." Bill Mears, High Court Debates Dog Fighting Videos, CNN.com (Oct.
6, 2009), ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED..
303. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 38-40 (contending crush videos do not fall
within framework of policy interests supported by First Amendment rights). For a
background of crush videos, see supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the industry surrounding animal cruelty, see supra notes 175-207 and
accompanying text.
304. See Brief of Animal Legal Defense, supra note 302, at 26 (applying crush
videos to Ferber factors, specifically the commercial market factor).
305. See id. at 29 (confirming lack of expressive messages in crush videos).
306. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 362-76 (summarizing Church of the Lukumi
analysis and arguing Court misapplied precedent). For a further discussion of the
aforementioned cases, see supra notes 113-135 and accompanying text.
307. For a further discussion of the Court's reasoning in Playboy, see supra
notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
308. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 355-66 (providing overview of free speech
theories and rejecting inclusion of depictions of animal cruelty within any posited
theory).
309. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 32 (explaining economic incentive to pro-
duce crush and dogfighting videos); see also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 200 (noting
Court's compelling interest in preventing criminals, in particular animal cruelty
perpetrators, from profiting from their crimes). But see Joan Biskupic, Supreme
Court Kills Animal-Cruelty Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 22, 2010, 11:02 AM), http://www.
usatoday.com/news/washington/jtudicial/2010- 0 4-20-animal-cruelty-supreme-
courtn.htm (applauding Court for affirmation of First Amendment rights regard-
less of social value).
2012] 321
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Furthermore, in R.A. V., the Court accepted a basic balancing
test to weigh the societal value of speech against the social interest
in order and morality.310 If there is no danger of idea or viewpoint
discrimination, then the restriction is likely to be deemed a con-
tent-neutral restriction on speech.3t ' It is startling to think that the
conduct depicted in crush videos and other depictions of animal
cruelty can be perceived as conveying an idea or a particular view-
point.3 1 2 Additionally, despite contentions that crush videos likely
classify as obscene, the Court sidestepped the issue of whether § 48
is an attempt at controlling the secondary effects of depictions of
animal cruelty, which would classify it as a content-neutral restric-
tion on speech. 13 In RA. V, the Court held that the government
may control the secondary effects of speech without reference to
the speech content. 14 Yet, in its analysis, the Court failed to con-
sider even a single, well-evidenced secondary effect of permitting
depictions of animal cruelty, such as gambling, weapons, and
drugs. 3 15 The Court also did not address the established causal link
between animal cruelty and societal ills, such as the resulting
human cruelty.3 1 6
Finally, in Church of the Lukumi, the Court implied its accept-
ance of a compelling governmental interest in preventing the suf-
fering or mistreatment of animals.317 While it is well established
310. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (balanc-
ing social value of speech with social interest in prohibiting its dissemination).
311. See id. at 388 (distinguishing between viewpoint discrimination and con-
tent-neutral regulations).
312. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 46-48 (rejecting finding of expressive value);
see also Brief of Animal Legal Defense, supra note 302, at 5 (failing to discern idea
or viewpoint furthered by crush videos).
313. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 383 (illustrating link between depictions of
animal cruelty and human violence); see also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 205 (listing
secondary effects accompanying dissemination of depictions of animal cruelty).
314. See RA.V, 505 U.S. at 389 (explaining validity of secondary effects
doctrine).
315. See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 205 (using secondary effects of animal cru-
elty as justification for prohibiting production). For a discussion of additional re-
search regarding harms associated with animal cruelty, see supra notes 32-40 and
accompanying text.
316. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 377-81 (displaying research regarding
human ills associated with animal cruelty). "Violence against animals affects many
people: the animal involved, the family members of the animal, the family of the
abuser, and any potential future victims." Salerno, supra note 34. One source pos-
tulated that the Court sidestepped this issue because "legislators are unaware of
the strong connection between violence towards animals and violence towards
humans." Ellington, supra note 36.
317. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 535 (1993) (accepting government justification); see also Brief for a Group of
American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9,
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that the Court relies on precedent in reaching a decision, the com-
parison it attempted to draw between preventing cruelty to humans
and the lesser interest in preventing cruelty to animals is an impos-
sible standard to satisfy.318 According to two commentators, "when
animal and human interests come into conflict, human interests,
quickly and unsurprisingly, trump the ethical and moral arguments
favoring animal protection."3 1 9 In fact, when the Court analyzes
the issue of the legitimacy of a government interest, it often does so
without reference to other disparate interests in other cases. 320
Simply because the interest in preventing harm to animals pales in
comparison to the interest in preventing harm to humans does not
mandate that animals should not receive protection from the gov-
ernment or the Court.3'
2. Court's Aversion to Create a New Category of Unprotected Speech
In the Court's discussion of whether it should carve out an ad-
ditional category of unprotected speech for depictions of animal
cruelty, it both contradicted precedent and failed to appreciate the
similarity between the speech prohibited by § 48 and prior catego-
ries of unprotected speech.322 First, despite the Court's warning
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (No. 08-769) [hereinafter Brief for
Professors] (contending Court assumed government interest in preventing animal
cruelty was compelling in Church of the Lukumi); Brief of Humane Society, supra
note 7, at 18 (arguing Court's mistaken reliance on Church of the Lukumi).
318. See China, supra note 30, at 4 (conveying inappropriateness of comparing
interests associated with child protection with that of animal protection); see also
Reynolds, supra note 4, at 384-85 (arguing interests associated with animal protec-
tion must be similarly compelling to interests associated with humans as "debatable
and inapposite").
319. Megan A. Senatori & Pamela D. Frasch, The Future ofAnimal Law: Moving
Beyond Preaching to the Choir, 60 J. OF LEGAL Enuc. 209, 216 (2010).
320. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 385 (devaluing Court's lack of occasion to
consider whether animals garner similar compelling interests from government).
For a further discussion of a finding of a compelling interest, see supra notes 73-
135 and accompanying text.
321. See China, supra note 30, at 4 (rejecting comparison of interests associ-
ated with child protection with that of animal protection); see also Reynolds, supra
note 4, at 384-85 (noting irrelevance of comparing human interests to animal
interests).
322. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 367-87 (justifying restrictions on depictions
of animal cruelty tinder incitement of violence, obscenity, and child pornography
doctrines); see also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 188-95 (linking applications of animal
cruelty to already established categories of unprotected speech). "[T]here are very
specific types of speech that we, as a society, have deemed so despicable and so
lacking in merit that they do not deserve protection, among them child pornogra-
phy obscenity, threats and incitement of violence. Animal cruelty should be one of
these unprotected categories." Chris Palmer & Peter Kimball, Supreme Court Gets It
Wrong With Animal Cruelty Ruling, SFGATE.COM (Apr. 23, 2010), http://articles.sf
gate.com/2010-04-23/opinion/20861742 1_animal-mutilation-animal-cruelty-act-
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toward the government that it would never adopt a simple ad hoc,
cost-benefit balancing test to determine if a particular type of
speech warrants First Amendment protection, it used this precise
approach in several free speech cases. 32s In Chaplinsky, the Court
explicitly stated that certain speech has such slight societal value
that the right to free speech can be trumped by the social interest
in order and morality.32 4 The Court repeated this language again
in Ferber, R.A.V, and Williams.325
The Court also failed to entertain the notion that depictions of
animal cruelty can fall into several established categories of unpro-
tected speech.326 Yet, in Giboney, the Court's core premise was that
speech integral to conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute is
not worthy of First Amendment protection.3 2 7 Even without the en-
actment of § 48, depictions of animal cruelty violate all fifty states'
animal cruelty laws.3 28 Violent criminal conduct is not protected
even if it exhibits expressive value, which in Stevens's case, the
dogfighting videos had no discernable value. 29 While discussing
free-speech. For a further discussion of categories of unprotected speech, see
supra notes 136-172 and accompanying text.
323. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (disclaiming
application of ad hoc balancing test). For further discussion of the Court's rejec-
tion of a balancing test, see supra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.
324. See Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (comparing
speech value to valid social internets in restricting speech).
325. For a further discussion of RA. V, see supra notes 113-119 and accompa-
nying text. For a further discussion of Willian, see supra notes 78-87 and accompa-
nying text. For a further discussion of Ferber, see supra notes 153-166 and
accompanying text.
326. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 367-87 (including depictions of animal cru-
elty within incitement of violence, obscenity, and child pornography doctrines); see
also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 188-95 (discussing animal cruelty in relation to well-
established categories of unprotected speech). For a further discussion of the
Court's analysis in Stevens, see supra notes 209-222 and accompanying text.
327. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (carv-
ing out new category of unprotected speech). "To make money off a crime is to
compound the crime . . . [b]ut we're expected to believe, 'It isn't murder, your
honor - it's free speech!" Patt Morrison, Does the First Amendment Protect Dog Snuff
Films?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2009, 10:35 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/patt-morrison/does-the-first-amendment b_193351.html.
328. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1599-1600 (Alito,J., dissenting) (arguing for lack
of First Amendment protection for producers or participators in crush videos); see
also Brief of the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 10, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (No.
08-769) [hereinafter Brief of the Center] (relating Stevens to Giboney). "The Center
on the Administration of Criminal Law ('the Center') is dedicated to defining
good government practices in criminal prosecutions through academic research,
litigation, and participation in the formulation of public policy." Id. at 1.
329. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1598-99 (Alito,J., dissenting) (emphasizing simi-
larities between conduct condemned in Ferber and that accepted by Court in
Stevens).
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basic principles of the First Amendment, a University of Chicago
professor stated, "the law separates the underlying illegality from
the resulting speech."330 Likewise, Roth dealt with obscenity, which
is material catering towards a prurient interest.33 ' The Court only
had to reference President Clinton's statement regarding § 48 to
discern that it was enacted specifically to target depictions of animal
cruelty catering towards a prurient interest.332 Crush videos gener-
ally qualify as unprotected under the established obscenity doc-
trine.3 3 3  The government never made this argument, and the
Court failed to propose it on its own accord.334
The main inconsistency in Stevens is the Court's analysis with
regard to Ferber.3 3 5 The Court severely undermined the "obvious
parallels between child pornography and depictions of animal cru-
elty."63 3 6 "Any rational person can draw the parallels between the
[I]t's important to understand that a basic principle of First Amendment
doctrine is that an individual ordinarily does not have a constitutional
right to do an act that is otherwise unlawful merely because he wants to
engage in free expression. For example, an individual does not have a
First Amendment right to speed . . . because he wants to make a movie
involving speeding; he does not have a First Amendment right to steal a
camera in order to make a video; and he does not have a First Amend-
ment right to wiretap a telephone conversation in order to prove that a
congressman has taken a bribe.
Geoffrey R. Stone, Dog-Fighting and the First Amendment, HUFFINGTON PosT (Apr. 25,
2010, 3:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/dog-fighting-
and-the-firs b_551138.html.
330. Stone, supra note 329.
331. See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Roth.
332. See Statement by President, supra note 23, at 324 (prohibiting "wanton
cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex").
333. See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foun-
dation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, United States v. Stevens, 130
S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (No. 08-769) [hereinafter Brief of Washington Legal] (accentu-
ating Third Circuit's admission that crush videos would qualify as obscene under
Miller standard). The Washington Legal Foundation is a public interest law and
policy center. See id. at 1 (providing background of foundation). The Allied Edu-
cational Foundation is a non-profit charitable foundation. Id.
334. For a further discussion, see supra notes 209-222 and accompanying text.
335. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 17 ("The reasoning of Ferber and its prog-
eny is squarely applicable to crush videos."); see also Recent Case, supra note 300, at
1243 (disclaiming Court's application of Ferber in Stevens). For a further discussion
of the Court's analysis of Ferber, see supra notes 219-222 and accompanying text.
336. See Brief Amicus Curiae of International Society for Animal Rights in
Support of Petitioner at 30, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (No.
08-769) [hereinafter Brief of International Society] (implying lack of inherent dif-
ferences between children and animals as proposed by Court in Ferber). "Interna-
tional Society for Animal Rights . . . [promotes] 'protection of animals from all
forms of cruelty and suffering inflicted upon them for the demands of science,
profit, sport or from neglect or indifference to their welfare or from any other
cause . . . ." Id. at 1; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae Northwest Animal Rights
2012] 325
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Court's decision in Ferber and the videos at issue in Stevens .... The
Court clearly ignores this, among other factual evidence that
dogfighting videos drive the illegal act of dogfighting."3 3 7  The
Court relied on the Third Circuit's proposition that animals and
children have inherent differences, and thus, animals should not
receive the same degree of protection as children.338 Yet, the Third
Circuit never specified, and the Court did not clarify, what the in-
herent differences are and why those differences exempt animals
from "societal and judicial solicitude."33 9 Furthermore, even if the
Court refused to recognize animals as living, intelligent beings that
endure pain no differently than humans, the Court could have
rested its analysis solely on the specific harms to children that result
from animal cruelty.340
The Court also deviated from its usual deference to legislative
judgment.34 ' In Ferber, the Court emphasized that legislatures often
rely on research and literature in determining the harmful effects
of certain conduct.342 The Court ordered deference to the legisla-
ture as to these findings because the legislature is uniquely situated
to glean relevant evidence to make statutory decisions.343 In Ste-
vens, it does not appear that the Court granted the legislature any
Network in Support of Petitioner at 4-5, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577
(2009) (No. 08-769) [hereinafter Brief for Northwest Animal] (listing similarities
between child pornography and depictions of animal cruelty). Northwest Animal
Rights Network is a volunteer animal protection organization. See id. at 1 (convey-
ing interest in amicus curiae). "Both categories of speech are created by capturing
in a visual medium the infliction of a serious injury, in a manner proscribed by
state law, upon a vulnerable victim." Id. at 4-5. See also Stone, supra note 329 (com-
paring illegality of filming act of child pornography with illegality of depicting
animal cruelty); Susan Estrich, No Place in 1st Amendment for Animal 'Crush' Videos,
NEWSMAX (Apr. 23, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/printtem-
plate.aspx?nodeid=356665 (arguing animals deserve same level of protection
against abuse as do children with child pornography).
337. Katie Bray, Decision on US v. Stevens Part 1: Not as Devastating as You May
Think, GAME DOG GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.gamedogguardian.com/
education-and-resources/us-v-stevens-analysis.
338. See Brief of International Society, supra note 336, at 30 (repeating
Court's contention in Ferber that children and animals have inherent differences
and do not garner same level of judicial protection).
339. See id. at 30 (rejecting lack of evidence upon which Third Circuit relied
in reaching its conclusion).
340. For further discussion of specific harms to children from animal cruelty,
see supra notes 32-38, 184 and accompanying text.
341. For a further discussion of the Court's analysis in Stevens, see supra notes
209-252 and accompanying text.
342. See N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982) (clarifying legislative ap-
proach to lawmaking).
343. See id. (highlighting legislative judgment regarding harms to children re-
sulting from child pornography); see also Brief for Northwest Animal, supra note
336, at 6 (revisiting Court's usual deference to legislative judgment).
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degree of deference or considered the relevant available
evidence. 34
The Court's main proposition in Ferber was that the distribution
of child pornography is intrinsically related to the abuse itself, and
the legislature could properly conclude that combating the market
for the videos was the most effective means of combating the abuse
itself.3 45 The Court in Stevens undertook a challenging feat to com-
pare animal cruelty to human cruelty.3 4 6 While child pornography
presents unique harms to which animal cruelty could never com-
pare, the distribution of depictions of animal cruelty is similarly in-
trinsically related to the abuse itself.34 7
In both cases, there is a seemingly pure economic motive to
produce the materials. 34" As is evidenced by the underground in-
dustry popularized by professional athletes, dogfighting videos are
widespread, suggesting that the market is a lucrative business with
profits channeling directly to the fight promoters.3 49
In both cases, there is severe injury, no eradication of the act
without eradication of the videos, and minimal, if not zero, value.350
344. For further discussion of the Court's analysis in Stevens, see supra notes
209-252 and accompanying text.
345. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 (discussing reasons depictions are intrinsically
related to abuse).
346. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (failing to find
similarity between speech in Ferber and that in Stevens); see also China, supra note 30,
at 4 (comparing interests associated with child protection with that of animal pro-
tection); Reynolds, supra note 4, at 384-85 (classifying argument that interests asso-
ciated with animal protection must be similarly compelling to interests associated
with humans as "debatable and inapposite"). "The allowance of [mistreatment of
animals in contexts like hunting] clearly reveals that our society does not consider
animal abuse on par with child abuse." Stone, supra note 329.
[T]he balancing process is nothing more than an illusion in which the
outcome has been predetermined in light of the very different status of
the supposedly competing parties. It is simply not possible to balance
meaningfully human interests, which are protected by claims of right in
general and of a right to own property in particular, against the interest
of property, which exist only as a means to the ends of persons.
Francione, supra note 41.
347. See Brief for Northwest Animal, supra note 336, at 4-5 (describing similar-
ities between child pornography and depictions of animal cruelty).
348. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 32 (explaining pure economic incentive to
produce crush and dogfighting videos); see also Brief for Northwest Animal, supra
note 236, at 19 (accepting relationship is not as strong for dogfighting as child
pornography, but nonetheless is sufficient to garner protection); Ricaurte, supra
note 2, at 200 (noting Court's compelling interest in preventing criminals, in par-
ticular animal cruelty perpetrators, from profiting from their crimes).
349. See Brief of Washington Legal, supra note 333, at 19-20 (highlighting
source of profit for dogfight promoters).
350. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative
justifications for passing § 48); Brief for Northwest Animal, supra note 336, at 7
3272012]
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It is especially noteworthy that the industry surrounding videos of
animal cruelty presents harm not only to animals but also real, doc-
umented harms to humans, including children.35' In both cases,
the speech depicts individuals committing crime that is committed
in order to depict the individuals' speech.352 Simply because ani-
mals are not children should not be the only determinant of
whether they receive protection, and the interest in protecting ani-
mals is no less compelling than the interest in protecting chil-
dren.3 53 Arguing that the Supreme Court reached the wrong
conclusion in Stevens, two commentators proffered, "[t]here is no
reason to ignore depictions of animal cruelty while rightfully
criminalizing parallel depictions of child abuse." 354 The Court
should make case-by-case determinations of the nature of the depic-
tions in relation to the abuse, conducting the analysis in direct ref-
erence to the video at issue.355 It neglected to take this approach in
Stevens.35"6
(showing similarities between eradication of child pornography and elimination of
depictions of animal cruelty). Furthermore, both are illegally captured in a visual
medium and inflict serious injury upon helpless victims. See Brief for Northwest
Animal, supra note 336, at 7 (justifying Court's finding of compelling interest). But
see Stone, supra note 329 (detailing differences between animal abuse and child
abuse). See also Estrich, supra note 336 (noting difficulty in discerning value of
protecting depictions of animal cruelty).
351. See Brief of International Society, supra note 336, at 19 (reviewing "grave
threats" to animals and humans); see also Kinsella, supra note 5, at 376-78 (implor-
ing Court to consider various human ills associated with depictions of animal cru-
elty); Reynolds, supra note 4, at 347-54 (conveying reasons for restricting violent
speech).
352. See Anclien, supra note 1, at 9 (mentioning notable relationship between
speech and crime).
353. See Brief for Professors, supra note 317, at 33 (stating government inter-
est "is no less compelling merely because the object of abuse is an animal and not a
human being."); see also China, supra note 30, at 4 (promoting increase in rights
for animals). "Whether its some crazed church group harassing families of soldiers
killed in combat, racial slurs, child pornography, or dogfighting videos, we all
seem to get it. It's wrong and we know it. Why is it so tough for the courts?" Bray,
supra note 337. "Just as we protect children through carefully tailored bans on
child pornography, so should we be entitled to protect animals from the effects of
gratuitous and criminal violence." Estrich, supra note 336.
354. Palmer, supra note 322.
355. See Recent Case, supra note 300, at 1246 (concluding courts should con-
sider context before applying Supreme Court precedent that is irrelevant to issue);
see also Reynolds, supra note 4, at 384-85 (advocating finding of compelling interest
for prevention of animal abuse).
356. For a further discussion of the Court's approach in Stevens, see supra
notes 209-252 and accompanying text.
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3. Reducing Facial Invalidity Standard to Less Than Substantial
Overbreadth
The largest portion of the Court's analysis was dedicated to the
issue of facial invalidity through applying an overbreadth test, but
its analysis was inconsistent with precedent.35 7 In Osborne, the Court
noted that when conducting an overbreadth analysis, a statute
should be construed in order to avoid constitutional conflicts. 58
The Court stated, "[i] t is a basic principle of constitutional adjudi-
cation that a statute should not be held unconstitutional unless the
court has first determined that the statute cannot be saved by a vali-
dating construction." 3 59 This coincides with the deference the
Court often grants the legislature in making statutory judgments.360
In Stevens, the Court took the opposite approach and rejected con-
sideration of the constitutional applications of § 48; it focused its
attention solely on the possible unconstitutional applications.3 61 It
is probable that § 48 does have a "plainly legitimate sweep" as re-
quired by the overbreadth test, and the Court should have required
Stevens to show that the statute was invalid specifically as applied to
his dogfighting videos.3 62 If the Court had conducted this analysis,
it would have gleaned that both crush videos and Stevens's
dogfighting videos fall within the narrow scope of the statute. 63
357. For a further discussion of the Court's historical overbreadth analysis,
see supra notes 73-107 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the
Court's overbreadth analysis in Stevens, see supra notes 223-252 and accompanying
text.
358. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119 (1990) (providing standards for
conducting overbreadth analysis).
359. Hill, supra note 76, at 1067.
360. For further discussion of the Court's grant of legislative deference, see
supra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
361. See Brief of Washington Legal, supra note 333, at 8 (advising Court to
consider constitutional applications of § 48). For a further discussion of the
Court's analysis in Stevens, see supra notes 223-252 and accompanying text. The
Court barely acknowledged that the cruelty depicted is, in fact, illegal. See Bray,
supra note 337 (lamenting outcome of Stevens).
362. See Brief of Washington Legal, supra note 333, at 9 (implicating impossi-
bility of finding overbreadth if lower court applied § 48 directly to Stevens's
dogfighting videos).
363. See Brief for the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27, United States v. Stevens, 130 S.
Ct. 1577 (2009) (No. 08-769) [hereinafter Brief of American Society] (suggesting
inclusion of dogfighting videos and crush videos in § 48). The American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals is the oldest humane organization in the
United States. See id. at I (introducing interest of amicus curiae). One commenta-
tor criticized the Court's decision by noting "[t]he . . . Act simply criminalizes
depictions of animal cruelty that are already illegal." Jim Moran, Sadly Missed the
Mark, THE HILL (Sept. 7, 2009, 4:46 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/letters/575
29-columnist-wrong-on-motive-effect-of-animal-cruelty-law.
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In fact, in Salerno, the Court articulated an unwillingness to
strike down a statute simply because it has a conceivable unconstitu-
tional application. 364 The Court has referred to the overbreadth
doctrine as "strong medicine" that should be used "sparingly and
only as a last resort."6 5 Yet, in Stevens, the doctrine was not im-
posed as a last resort.366 The Third Circuit never considered an
overbreadth challenge in its analysis in Stevens, so it was seemingly
hasty for the Court to consider an overbreadth challenge on ap-
peal.367 The Supreme Court has said that "[i]t is not the usual judi-
cial practice . . . nor do we consider it generally desirable, to
proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily - that is, before it is
determined that the statute would be valid as applied." 3 68
Furthermore, Stevens's case was the first prosecution under
§ 48, so there was a complete lack of history and precedent regard-
ing the statute's proper or improper application.369 Applying the
statute directly to hunting videos and animal slaughter videos, the
Court concluded that § 48 was unconstitutional because it dis-
cerned the possibility of an improper conviction under the stat-
ute.37 0' A conceivable basis for unconstitutionality does not
automatically render a statute invalid, and the Court failed to ana-
364. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (requiring more
than fanciful basis for unconstitutionality).
365. See Brief of Washington Legal, supra note 333, at 10 (citing Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)) (reviewing Third Circuit's unwillingness to
conduct overbreadth analysis).
366. See Hill, supra note 76 (criticizing Court's contradictory application of
overbreadth doctrine).
367. Brief of Washington Legal, supra note 333, at 11 (requesting Court re-
frain from conducting overbreadth analysis and confine its analysis specifically to
Stevens's conduct).
368. Id. at 11-13 (citing Bd. of Tr. of St. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-
85 (1989). The Humane Society of the United States stated that,
Declaring a statute facially overbroad after finding a party's speech pro-
tected 'would convert use of the overbreadth doctrine from a necessary
means of vindicating the plaintiffs own right not to be bound by a statute
that is unconstitutional into a means of mounting a gratuitous wholesale
attacks upon state and federal laws.'
Id. at 25. "The tenuous nature of the Court's hold on the FAO Doctrine can be
gauged from the fact that the Court has made contradictory statements about the
remedial consequences of overbreadth, in apparent unawareness of any inconsis-
tency." Hill, supra note 76.
369. See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008), affd, 130 S.
Ct. 1577 (2010) (recognizing primacy of § 48 analysis); see also Brief of Washington
Legal, supra note 333, at 12 (contending Court should wait to conduct overbreadth
analysis until determining § 48 is an actual threat to First Amendment rights).
370. For a further discussion of the Court's analysis, see supra notes 223-252
and accompanying text.
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lyze whether the statute was valid directly as applied to Stevens's
dogfights.37'
A brief review of state law reveals that § 48 is not overbroad, as
the statute only prohibits depictions of acts that are already illegal
in the states. 372 Currently, there is no documentation suggesting
that any animal cruelty law has been interpreted to reach "culturally
accepted commercial and recreational uses of animals."373 Like
§ 48, state law creates exemptions for hunting, fishing, scientific re-
search, and humane farming activities.374 Evidencing the govern-
ment's prudent approach to animal cruelty, there have not been
any prosecutions against people who use animals in ways that evince
humane purposes.375 Furthermore, in failing to construe statutory
terms in relation to other language in the text, the Court conflicts
with its own direction to construe statutes to avoid constitutional
problems.3 7 6 Defining "serious value" is easily undertaken when
referencing statutory text, in addition to consulting state anti-cru-
elty laws.3 77
In Ashcroft, the Court recognized the modern challenges of
construing statutes due to the proliferation of the Internet, and the
Court determined that it must construe statutes from a modern
perspective.378 Yet, in Stevens, the Court seemed to take less than a
modern approach in interpreting the statute. 37 Given the prolifer-
ation of the Internet, children often have unrestricted access to
371. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1593 (2010) (Alito, J., dis-
senting) (rejecting Court's unwillingness to consider § 48 as applied directly to
Stevens); see also Brief of the Center, supra note 328, at 21 (disclaiming invalidation
of statute in "fanciful hypotheticals").
372. See Brief for Northwest Animal, supra note 336, at 17 ("18 U.S.C. § 48
only prohibits depicting what the 9tates prohibit doing.").
373. See id. (discussing lack of evidence suggesting improper application of
§ 48).
374. See id. (listing state exemptions).
375. See id. at 17-18 (excluding actions undertaken to inflict gratuitous pain
that is unnecessary for conduct).
376. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119 (1990) (outlining method of stat-
utory construction). For a further discussion of the Court's overbreadth analysis,
see supra notes 231-236 and accompanying text.
377. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1602 (2010) (Alito J., dis-
senting) (providing appendix containing animal cruelty laws from all fifty states).
For the full text of § 48, see supra note 26.
378. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566-67 (2002) (promoting Court
adaptability due to Internet proliferation).
379. For a further discussion, see supra notes 209-252 and accompanying text.
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websites, and accidental or even intentional access to crush videos
and other depictions of animal cruelty is inevitable.sso
The primary inconsistency in the Stevens Court analysis con-
cerns the issue of legislative judgment and societal consensus.38 ' In
Glucksberg, the Court opined that societal consensus is an important
factor to consider when construing a statute. 382 Societal consensus
often emerges in the form of legislative action, here, the enactment
of § 48.383 Virginia State Representative Jim Moran offered support
for § 48, noting "[twenty-six] state attorneys general[s] . . . asked
the federal courts to uphold this law because it's vital to protect
animals and the larger community from violence, drug trafficking
and other crimes that flow from those who perpetrate these mali-
ciously cruel videos." 84 The Court rejected this argument in Ste-
vens, despite its opinion in Glucksberg that the legislature acts in the
proper forum to consider the most effective means of combating a
problem. 185
In Salerno, similar to the justification in Stevens, the statute in
question was passed in response to the deficiencies of the current
system.3 86 Regardless, the fact that animal cruelty perpetrators hide
their identities and film videos using a method that makes prosecu-
380. See Brief of International Society, supra note 336, at 20-21 (stating risk of
juvenile access to depictions of animal cruelty as "certainty"). One commentator
noted:
[IT]he Court is kidding itself concerning these technology cases if it
thinks it can wait until some definite moment in the future when these
technologies will stop changing and then suddenly announce a perfect
standard. Technology never stops changing. And any standard will be
imprecise until it is applied in actual cases.
MarkS. Kende, The Impact of Cyberspace on the First Amendment, 1 VA.J. L. TFCH. 7,15
(1997).
381. See Brief of International Society, supra note 336, at 22 ("Section 48
clearly and unambiguously identifies the legislative judgment upon which Section
48 rests . . ."); see also Kinsella, supra note 5, at 374-75 (recognizing neglect of
societal consensus despite history and well known aversion to animal cruelty).
382. See Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711, 786-88 (1997) (emphasizing
legislature's unique position to discern societal consensus); see also Brief for North-
west Animal, supra note 336, at 6 (commenting on Court's unwillingness to second-
guess legislative decisions). Many leading First Amendment cases look to over-
whelming state consensus to decide whether a state interest is compelling. See id.
at 6 (pointing to Roth and Ferber as examples of legislative deference).
383. See Kinsella, supra note 5, at 374-75 (describing importance of considera-
tion of societal consensus).
384. Moran, supra note 363.
385. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 788 (conveying legislatures unique position);
see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (rejecting notion that
abhorrence of animal cruelty is ingrained in historical tradition).
386. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (summarizing defi-
ciencies of Act). For a further discussion of the Court's justifications in Stevens, see
supra notes 209-252 and accompanying text.
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tion virtually impossible, these factors bore no importance to the
Court when judging the legislature's decision.3 8 7
American society places considerable importance on prevent-
ing unnecessary cruelty to animals.388 As evidenced by nineteenth
century cases and laws, " [s]ociety views the acts of cruelty at issue as
antithetical to public mores and decency, as demonstrated by the
longstanding illegality of such acts."38 9 As early as 1641, there were
laws proscribing acts of animal cruelty, and when the Court decided
Stevens, all fifty states had laws criminalizing animal cruelty.39 0
When Ferber was decided, child pornography was illegal in "virtu-
ally" every state.39 ' The importance of animals in American society
is further evidenced by the fact that the legal profession recognizes
animal interests as legitimate and vital to the study of law.392
Animal cruelty coincides with well-documented, considerable
human ills, such as the palpable link between animal cruelty and
violence against humans, domestic violence, and sexual assault.3 93
387. See Brief of Washington Legal, supra note 333, at 21 (displaying difficul-
ties associated with prosecuting animal cruelty perpetrators). "The Court has rec-
ognized those logistical problems and the need to accommodate First Amendment
doctrine to them." Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002)).
388. See Brief of Humane Society, supra note 7, at 14 ("Prohibitions on animal
cruelty are deeply ingrained in American law."); see also Brief of Washington Legal,
supra note 333, at 17 (imploring Court to recognize importance of preventing
animal cruelty). "Because the government and states have a substantial interest in
protecting animals from cruelty outlined in clear constitutional laws, and because
depictions of animal cruelty serve to propagate animal cruelty, § 48 should be up-
held." Bray, supra note 337.
389. Brief of Florida, supra note 38, at 4.
390. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1602 (AlitoJ., dissenting) (providing appendix
containing animal cruelty laws from all fifty states); see also Brief of Humane Soci-
ety, supra note 7, at 7 (noting inordinate costs spent by states on animal shelters).
In fact, the Humane Society estimates that between $800 million and $1 billion is
spent annually to support over 1,500 animal shelters in the United States. See id. at
16 (evidencing America's view that animals deserve humane treatment); see also
Brief for Northwest Animal, supra note 336, at 7 (providing background of Na-
tion's history regarding animal cruelty); Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 177 (summariz-
ing state anti-cruelty laws).
391. See Brief for Northwest Animal, supra note 336, at 7 (comparing speed of
state action to combat child pornography to haste with which states outlawed
animal cruelty).
392. See Brief for Professors, supra note 317, at 3-4 (introducing background
of animal law). "Animal law is currently taught at no less than 112 law schools,
including Harvard, Northwestern, Columbia, Cornell, University of Chicago, Stan-
ford, and Georgetown." Id. Likewise, at least fifteen states have bar groups com-
mitted to animal law. See id. at 4-5 (listing states with bar committees dedicated to
animal law).
393. See Brief of American Society, supra note 363, at 3 (justifying restriction
on depictions of animal cruelty); see also Brief for Northwest Animal, supra note
336, at 8-9 (summarizing negative impact of animal cruelty on society); Brief for
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The link between animal cruelty and violence against humans
formed the basis for the legislature's decision to enact § 48, and the
Court should have found the legislature's interest compelling.3 94
V. IMPACT
The direct impact of the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Stevens is uniquely short-lived.395 After extensive delibera-
tion to revise § 48, the Senate concluded that crush videos are un-
deniably excluded from First Amendment protection by implicitly
citing to Supreme Court precedent such as Giboney and Miller.39"
Legislative consensus was in full effect; during Senate hearings
about the new law, "not a single word of opposition was voiced to
banning crush videos ... ."3 After the bill passed the House by a
416-3 vote, the Senate passed an amended bill by unanimous con-
sent.39 8 President Obama signed the bill into law on December 9,
2010.39 An excerpt from the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act
reads:
Professors, supra note 317, at 28-29 (identifying link between serial killers and
animal abuse). For a further discussion of notable mass murderers and their ad-
missions regarding childhood animal cruelty, see Brief for Professors, supra note
317, at 28-29 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the links between
animal cruelty and human violence, see supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
394. See Brief of American Society, supra note 363, at 19 (restating legislative
judgment in passing § 48). For a further discussion of the legislature's justifica-
tions behind the passage of § 48, see supra note 28-44 and accompanying text.
395. See Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-294,
124 Stat. 3177S. 3841, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Act] (providing content of
revised statute); see also Congressional Record, Prevention of Interstate Commerce in
Animal Crush Videos Act of 2010 - (Senate - September 28, 2010), UNITn STATES SEN-
ATE (Sept. 28, 2010), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r111:S28SEO-0059:
(detailingjustifications behind revision); Senate Passes the Animal Crush Video Prohibi-
tion Act, SENATUS (Sept. 29, 2010), http://senatus.wordpress.com/2010/09/29/
senate-passes-the-animal-crush-video-prohibition-act/ (noting bill must pass House
of Representatives, which previously passed its own version of the bill). The new
law was co-sponsored by Senators Jeff Merkley of Oregon, Jon Kyl of Arizona, and
Richard Burr of North Carolina. See Bill Mears, Obama signs law banning 'crush
videos' depicting animal cruelty, CNN PoLITIcs (Dec. 10, 2010), http://articles.cnn.
com/2010-12-10/politics/animal.crueltyldog-fighting-videos-crush-videos-
animal-cruelty?.s=pm:politics (reviewing changes to revised law). The law received
overwhelming bipartisan support from both the House of Representatives and the
Senate, especially from Representatives Elton Gallegly of California and Gary Pe-
ters of Michigan. See The HSUS Applauds, supra note 12 (praising swift govern-
ment response to damaging Supreme Court decision).
396. See Congressional Record, supra note 395 (describing legislative judg-
ment in forming revised statute).
397. See Martin Matheny, Crush Video Ban Moving Forward in the U.S. Senate,
CHANGE.ORG (Sept. 16, 2010) (discussing unusually hasty congressional action).
398. See Fisher, supra note 17 (summarizing legislative process).
399. See id. (noting progression of Act).
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Sec. 48. Animal crush videos
(a) Definition- In this section the term 'animal crush
video' means any photograph, motion-picture film, video
or digital recording, or electronic image that-
(1) depicts actual conduct in which 1 or more living
non-human mammals, birds, reptiles, or amphibians
is intentionally crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated,
impaled, or otherwise subjected to serious bodily in-
jury....
(2) is obscene.
(b) Prohibitions-
(2) DISTRIBUTION OF ANIMAL CRUSH VIDEOS-
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell,
market, advertise, exchange, or distribute an animal
crush video in, or using a means or facility of, inter-
state or foreign commerce, or to attempt or conspire
to do so. 400
The statute contains various exceptions reminiscent of the Court's
concerns in Stevens.'" 1
Regardless of the Senate's actions and the passage of a revised
law, the Court's opinion in Stevens has several potentially damaging
implications for other areas of law. 4 02 The Court's half-hearted reli-
ance on precedent suggests that it approaches novel cases using an
ad hoc analysis, as its opinion in Stevens regarding First Amendment
rights does not seem reliant on past case law. 403 If crush videos and
dogfighting videos like Michael Vick's or Stevens's are classified as
400. Act, supra note 395. The Act imposes penalties of up to seven years in
prison for violations. See Mears, supra note 395 (detailing contents of revised law).
401. See Act, supra note 395 (exempting acts like hunting, humane slaughter,
or ordinary veterinary practices). "By cracking down on the creation and distribu-
tion of crush videos, this bipartisan law effectively protects both animals and free
speech." See Mears, supra note 395 (quoting Senator Jeff Merkley). But see Tony
Mauro, President Signs Bill Banning Animal Crush Videos, THE BLT (Dec. 10, 2010,
1:15 PM), http://legaltiines.typepad.com/bit/2010/12/president-signs-bill-ban-
ning-aninal-crush-videos.html (raising possibility of future controversy over
amended law). For the text of the bill, see supra note 400 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of the Court's concerns in Stevens, see supra notes 224-248
and accompanying text.
402. See Recent Case, supra note 300, at 1239 (discussing category specific im-
plications); see also Kinsella, supra note 5, at 362-76 (imploring Court to recognize
compelling interest or classify crush videos as obscene speech).
403. For further discussion of the Court's analysis in Stevens, see supra notes
209-252 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Supreme Court bal-
ancing tests, see supra notes 323-325 and accompanying text.
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expressive speech, it suggests the Court drastically reduced the stan-
dard for classifying speech as expressive. 404
This proposition is further evidenced by the recent Supreme
Court case of Snyder v. Phelps.4015 The Westboro Baptist Church con-
gregation, headed by Fred Phelps, pickets and protests at funerals
to convey the congregation's belief that the United States is overly
tolerant of "sin" such as homosexuality, especially in the military.406
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in Iraq while
serving a tour of duty, and the Westboro Baptist Church picketed
his funeral with signs like "Thank God for Dead Soldiers."407 Ajury
awarded Snyder's family over ten million dollars in damages.4018
The Court held that Phelps and his congregation had a right
to public debate, despite the undeniably hurtful content of the
speech.40"
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move
them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did
here-inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we can-
not react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Na-
tion we have chosen a different course-to protect even
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not
stifle public debate. 4 1o
404. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584-86 (2010) (comparing
valid content-based restrictions on speech to depictions of animal cruelty). For
further discussion of the Court's expressive speech precedent, see supra notes 109-
135 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the Court's expressive
speech analysis in Stevens, see supra notes 299-321 and accompanying text.
405. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). See also Andrea Stone, Fred
Phelps'Daughters May Misread Bible but They Know the Law, AOL NEws (Mar. 3, 2011,
5:49 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2011/03/03/fred-phelps-daughters-may-mis-
read-bible-but-they-know-the-law/ (describing Supreme Court holding).
406. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1213 (providing background of church and its
leader).
407. See id. (listing various signs used during picketing events); see also Brent
Kendall, First Amendment Protects Hurtful' Speech, Court says, WALL STRFET JOURNAL,
March 3, 2011, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB000142405274
8703559604576176323629295598.html (reporting outcome of well publicized Su-
preme Court battle).
408. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1214-15 (summarizing procedural posture of
case). The judge reduced the award to about five million dollars. See Kevin
Goldberg, Snyder v. Phelps: The Swami Makes the Call, COMMLAwBLoc (Nov. 29,
2010), http://www.commlawblog.com/2010/11/articles/first-amendment/sny-
der-v-phelps-the-swami-makes-the-call/ (analyzing probable outcome of Supreme
Court review in favor of Phelps).
409. See Kendall, supra note 407 (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts).
410. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
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Justice Alito, the lone dissenter in Stevens, voiced his distaste for the
Court's unyielding protection of First Amendment rights.4 1
Respondents' outrageous conduct caused petitioner great
injury, and the Court now compounds that injury by de-
priving petitioner of a judgment that acknowledges the
wrong he suffered.
In order to have a society in which public issues can be
openly and vigorously debated, it is not necessary to allow
the brutalization of innocent victims like petitioner. 412
If crush videos, dogfight videos, and vicious words directed at fallen
soldiers evince expressive meaning, it is unlikely the Court will have
grounds to uphold restrictions on free speech absent extremely
rare circumstances. 4 13 The Court's holdings in Stevens, Phelps, and
other recent cases "suggest that the Roberts court is prepared to
adopt a robustly libertarian view of the constitutional protection of
free speech."414 Furthermore, First Amendment case law repeat-
edly uses language that implicates an application of a balancing
test, despite the Court's contention that it refuses to apply ad hoc
balancing and that the government's suggestion it do so was star-
tling and dangerous. 4 15
Additionally, the Court's rejection of the proposition that ani-
mals should glean similar protections afforded to humans places an
enormous damper on the future of animal rights. 4 16 The decision
inherently indicates that any time the Court is presented with an
411. Id. at 1222-29 (Alito, J., dissenting) (expressing horror at Court's
holding).
412. Id. at 1229 (Alito, J., dissenting).
413. See Adam Liptak, fustices Reject Ban on Videos of Animal Cruelty, N.Y. TImES,
Apr. 20, 2010, http://www.nytines.com/2010/04/21/us/21scotus.html (review-
ing recent First Amendment doctrine).
414. Id. See also Bonnie Erba, 'Crush' Video Ruling: Another Supreme Court Power
Grab, PoLITics DAILs (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/04/23/
crush-video-ruling-another-supreme-court-power-grab/ (expressing disbelief over
the holdings in Stevens and Citizens United). For another illustrative case on this
point, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (striking
down limits on political spending by corporations).
415. For a further discussion of the Court's balancing tests, see supra note
323-325 and accompanying text; see also United States. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577,
1585-86 (2010) (disagreeing with suggestion to apply balancing test to Stevens).
For a further discussion of the Williams balancing test, see supra notes 78-87 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of R.A.V. balancing, see supra notes
113-119 and accompanying text.
416. See Brief of Humane Society, supra note 7, at 21 (arguing Court's deci-
sion is devastating to animal welfare and interests of those who actively support
animal rights). For a further discussion of the Stevens opinion, see supra notes 212-
222 and accompanying text.
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animal rights issue, it will automatically compare the rights at stake
to similarly situated human rights.4 17 In many cases, animal rights
are inextricably intertwined with human rights, as evidenced by the
suggestion the Court received that crush video perpetrators were
interested in using a human child as a video subject. 418 The adult
and child dangers from animal cruelty are near certainties. 4 19 It is
undeniable that human rights trump animal rights, but that fact
alone should not reduce the degree of support animals garner from
the law.420 After Church of the Lukumi in 1993, the Court was not
presented with any issue of animal rights until Stevens almost twenty-
years later, and it is unlikely the Court will grant certiorari in a case
concerning animal rights for quite some time.421
Most startling is the effect Stevens may have on the Court's strict
scrutiny doctrine.422 The decision will constrict courts' ability to
find a compelling interest, and it will render it impossible for courts
to apply heightened scrutiny when confronted with a case involving
animal rights.423 The Court's decision has already created uncer-
tainty in the lower courts, as evidenced by the Seventh Circuit deci-
sion in United States v. Skoien,424 The case concerned Second
Amendment rights and whether Congress could properly draw a
417. See Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 194 (describing changing view towards
animal rights). It would likely require a legal shift to create a body of law where
animals not only receive rights equal to humans, but in certain situations, rights
beyond those granted to humans. See id. (noting necessary precedent shift).
418. See Brief of Florida, supra note 38, at 29 (providing evidence that many
videos use toy dolls to represent human child); see also Brief of International Soci-
ety, supra note 336, at 19 (reviewing "grave threats" to animals and humans); An-
clien, supra note 1, at 9 (mentioning notable relationship between speech and
crime); Kinsella, supra note 5, at 376-78 (imploring Court to consider various
human ills associated with depictions of animal cruelty).
419. For a further discussion of the dangers of animal cruelty, see supra notes
32-40, 182-184, 315-316.
420. See China, supra note 30, at 4 (conveying inappropriateness of comparing
interests associated with child protection with that of animal protection); see also
Reynolds, supra note 4, at 384-85 (classifying argument that interests associated
with animal protection must be similarly compelling to interests associated with
humans as "debatable and inapposite"). For a further discussion of proper animal
rights, see supra notes 388-404 and accompanying text.
421. See Brief of Humane Society, supra note 7, at 21 ("In the ensuing decade-
and-a-half, no other court has decided this question and there is no reason to
believe the issue will present itself in a posture meriting this Court's review again in
the near future.").
422. See id. (extending implications to all animal welfare legislation that could
conceivably be subject to strict scrutiny); see also Kinsella, supra note 5, at 381
(describing harm to social policy from Court's finding that depictions of animal
cruelty do not serve compelling government interest).
423. See Brief of Humane Society, supra note 7, at 21.
424. U.S. v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674
(2011).
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categorical exclusion against possession of firearms for those con-
victed of misdemeanor crimes; in this case, domestic violence. 4 25
The court relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in Stevens but was
unable to find guidance because the Court failed to decide how
substantial the public interest must be to adopt a new categorical
limit on free speech. 4 26 Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit was able to
reach a holding on different grounds. 427
The Court recently tested its strict scrutiny doctrine in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association.428 The California law in ques-
tion imposed restrictions on the sale or rental of violent video
games to minors.429 Holding that the law must pass strict scrutiny,
the Ninth Circuit found that the state government's research re-
garding the harms of violent video games was faulty and not based
on causation. 430 The law was struck down, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reached a decision in June 201 1.431 The
Court was seemingly unconcerned with the form of violence in Ste-
vens or the potential for serious physical and psychological harm to
children, so it is unsurprising that based on the controversial stud-
ies presented to the Court in Brown, that the Court was unwilling
break its trend of unwavering protection of First Amendment
rights. 43 2
The Stevens decision may also constrict the legislature's ability
to refine laws to meet impossible Supreme Court standards. 4 33 if
the government interests in passing § 48 did not muster recogni-
tion of a compelling interest, it appears the government is inevita-
425. See id. at 639 (describing background of case).
426. See id. at 642 (referring to Court's levels of scrutiny as "quagmire").
427. See id. at 645 (affirming conviction).
428. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Assoc., No 08-1448, slip op. at I (U.S. June
2011) (holding video games entitled to First Amendment protection and Act failed
to satisfy strict scrutiny). See also Kendall, supra note 407, at A2 (listing most recent
First Amendment cases to reach the Supreme Court).
429. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953-54
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (discussing facts of case).
430. See id. at 961-67 (analyzing California's supposed compelling interest).
431. See id. at 964-65 (holding state government did not employ least restric-
tive means); see also Brown, slip op. at 1 (explaining procedural posture leading to
grant of certiorari).
432. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs.
Ass'n, (No. 08-1448) (questioning differences between violent video games and
depictions of animal cruelty); see also Brown, slip op. at 17 (commenting on states'
failed attempts to shelter minors from violent entertainment).
433. See id. (predicting future legislative hesitation to enact laws targeting "de-
pictions of atrocious and illegal cruelty").
2012] 339
59
Shafer: Perplexing Precedent: United States v. Stevens Confounds a Centur
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
340 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
bly estopped from passing valuable laws.43 4 The Court disregarded
evidenced harms of animal cruelty, and there is nothing to suggest
it disregarded the harms for any truly justifiable reason.43 5 Further-
more, in light of the Stevens opinion, it will be increasingly difficult
for courts to classify speech as unprotected, such as speech that is
obscene or integral to criminal conduct. 436 Crush videos appeal to
a prurient interest in sex and represent speech integral to criminal
conduct. 437 Yet, the Court rejected these clear notions and intro-
duced precedent that muddles past case law and complicates future
recognition of speech as falling into an unprotected category.438
Finally, the Court complicated its application of the over-
breadth doctrine and left the ultimate capability of interpreting
overbreadth precedent in the hands of ajudge skilled in the art of
complex puzzles. 439 § 48 had perfectly clear constitutional applica-
tions, but the Court instead focused on the unconstitutional appli-
434. See Brief of American Society, supra note 363, at 3 (justifying restriction
on depictions of animal cruelty); see also Brief for Northwest Animal, supra note
336, at 8-9 (summarizing negative impact of animal cruelty on society); Kinsella,
supra note 5, at 381 (showing implications of Court's finding to controversies in-
volving violence); Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 180 (listing various government inter-
ests in prohibiting animal cruelty). For a further discussion of the government's
compelling interest, see supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text. For a further
discussion of notable mass murderers and their admissions regarding childhood
animal cruelty, see Brief for Professors, supra note 317, at 29.
435. See Brief of American Society, supra note 363, at 3 (evincing harms of
animal cruelty). For a further discussion of the Court's disregard of harms, see
supra notes 209-252 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the harms
associated with animal cruelty, see supra notes 32-40, 182-184, 315-316 and accom-
panying text.
436. See Recent Case, supra note 300, at 1239 (conveying harm in Stevens pre-
cedent as its ability to constrict courts' ability to classify speech as falling within
several categories of unprotected speech); see also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 188-95
(summarizing issues stemming from Court's expansion or creation of new catego-
ries of unprotected speech).
437. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 367-87 (justifying restrictions on depictions
of animal cruelty under incitement of violence, obscenity, and child pornography
doctrines); see also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 188-95 (linking applications of animal
cruelty to already established categories of unprotected speech). For further dis-
cussion of the inclusion of depictions of animal cruelty into already established
categories of unprotected speech, see supra notes 326-334 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of unprotected speech, see supra notes 136-172 and accom-
panying text.
438. For further discussion of the Court's analysis of unprotected speech, see
supra notes 209-222 and accompanying text.
439. See Hill, supra note 76 (reviewing complicated overbreadth precedent).
For a background of the overbreadth doctrine, see supra notes 73-108 and accom-
panying text. For a further discussion of the Court's overbreadth analysis in Ste-
vens, see supra notes 223-252 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
the problems stemming from the Court's analysis, see supra notes 357-394 and ac-
companying text.
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cations, straying from well-established boundaries of the
overbreadth test.440 The Stevens opinion provides little guidance to
the legislature as to the level of societal consensus required to enact
a statute and undermines the Court's trust of both the legislature
and executive branch.4 4 ' The decision "creates a major void in the
federal government's ability to take effective action against acts of
cruelty to animals undertaken for commercial purposes."4 42 The
reality is that animals remain personal property according to the
law, and until the Court faces the realization that many, arguably a
majority, of Americans consider animals vital members of their fam-
ilies and livelihoods, it is unlikely animals will garner necessary legal
support from the highest authority in the Nation.4 4 3 Notions about
animals are rapidly changing, and "[l]aws that treat animals as
'property' are arcane and should be revised to treat animals as the
living, loving, soulful beings that they are, rather than as
property. "444
Until that milestone, it seems that the Court will continue to
refrain from recognizing the evil in depictions of animal cruelty
and the underlying act. Criticizing the Stevens decision, two writers
suggested, "the court has gone too far in protecting the free speech
of those who would profit from films depicting wanton and mali-
cious cruelty to animals solely for customers' entertainment."445 It
is all but inevitable that underground dogfights will become more
elusive, and celebrities will continue to mistreat animals. In light of
Stevens, one can only imagine what limits television networks will
push for the sake of entertainment. 446 It is disconcerting to con-
template what the future holds for similar abhorrent acts and simi-
440. For a further discussion of the Court's overbreadth analysis in Stevens, see
supra notes 223-252 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Justice
Alito's dissent, see supra notes 253-298 and accompanying text.
441. See Brief of International Society, supra note 336, at 22 ("Section 48
clearly and unambiguously identifies the legislative judgment upon which Section
48 rests . . . ."); see also Kinsella, supra note 5, at 374-75 (recognizing neglect of
societal consensus despite history and well known aversion to animal cruelty). For
further discussion of societal consensus, see supra notes 381-394 and accompany-
ing text.
442. Brief of Washington Legal, supra note 333, at 12.
443. See China, supra note 30, at 4 (recognizing animals position as personal
property under law); see also Ricaurte, supra note 2, at 194 (commenting on hur-
dles to granting animals proper rights); Francione, supra note 41 (proposing legal
status of animals as property has "severely limited" their legal protection).
444. Francione, supra note 41.
445. Palmer, supra note 322.
446. See Mountain, supra note 204 (questioning difference between Stevens
and acceptable family entertainment).
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lar victims, whether human or animal, without a voice or speech of
their own.
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